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INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, Richard Stengel had a SynchroMed EL Pump and 
Catheter manufactured by Medtronic implanted into his abdomen to 
deliver pain relief medication to his spine.1  Five years later, Stengel 
began to experience ascending paralysis caused by a granuloma, or an 
inflammatory mass in his spine that formed at the tip of the catheter.2  
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224,1227 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 2. Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 676 F.3d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc 
granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012), and rev’d on reh’g en banc, 704 F.3d 1224 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
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Surgeons then removed the catheter and most of the granuloma, but 
it was not in time.  The granuloma that formed at the catheter tip had 
rendered Stengel permanently paraplegic.3  Stengel has since died, 
allegedly from injuries he suffered in connection with the device.4 
Richard Stengel is just one of the many people who have been 
injured by Class III medical devices.  Class III medical devices are 
devices that either are used to sustain human life or present an 
unreasonable risk of injury.5  In 2009, the FDA issued over 160 Class I 
recalls of medical devices.6  Over the past year, over 500 medical-
device related injuries and over 500 medical-device related deaths 
were reported to the FDA.7 
Preemption externalizes the harms of medical devices from the 
manufacturers to the government and the public.8  In fact, the failures 
associated with Medtronic’s Sprint Fidelis Leads could cost the 
government and the public up to $1 billion dollars.9  A Sprint Fidelis 
Lead is a pacemaker lead that provides an electrical conduit between 
a pacemaker and heart, and thereby shocks the heart back into a 
normal rhythm when it detects an abnormality.10  After the Sprint 
Fidelis Lead was implanted into 150,000 patients, Medtronic issued a 
worldwide recall, and the FDA then issued a Class I recall due to the 
high failure rate associated with the leads.11  Medtronic advised that 
the leads implanted into patients prior to the recall remain implanted 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1226. 
 4. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 4, Stengel, 704 F.3d 1224 (No. 
12-1351). 
 5. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2012). 
 6. See H. DENNIS TOLLEY, EXAMINING THE SPRINT FIDELIS EFFECT ON 
MEDICARE COSTS 2 (2010).  A Class I recall, the most serious type, is one in which 
there is a reasonable probability of serious health consequences or death. See 
Background and Definitions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
safety/recalls/ucm165546.htm (last updated June 24, 2009).  There also are adverse 
incidents associated with medical devices that have not been recalled or extensively 
litigated.  For instance, the FDA has reported there have been twenty deaths and five 
hundred adverse events associated with Seprafilm, an adhesion barrier used to 
prevent post-surgical adhesions but there has yet to be a recall.  
 7. SEE FDA, Maude- Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfMAUDE/results.cfm. 
 8. See David Chang, Internalizing the External Costs of Medical Device 
Preemption, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 298 (2013). 
 9. See TOLLEY, supra note 6, at 19; Chang, supra note 8, at 302. 
 10. TOLLEY, supra note 6, at 3. 
 11. Id. A Sprint Fidelis Lead is a pacemaker lead that provides an electrical 
conduit between the pacemaker and the heart, which shocks the heart back into a 
normal rhythm if it detects an abnormality.  Although for most leads there is a small 
rate of failure due to fracture, Sprint Fidelis leads have failed at higher rates than 
other leads. Id. at 2–3, 8. 
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because of the risks involved with surgically extracting the leads.12  
Instead of replacement, patients with the leads implanted are either 
closely monitored, or their leads are turned off, capped, and then 
replaced with another lead.13 
Monitoring and replacing these leads impose significant health care 
costs.14  Because about eighty-five percent of the people who were 
implanted with Sprint Fidelis Leads were on Medicare, the Medicare 
program has paid millions of dollars in replacement and monitoring 
costs.15  If preemption did not exist—and manufacturers were forced 
to internalize these costs by facing potential lawsuits—Medtronic may 
have acted more quickly in addressing the defects in their leads.16  
Quicker action by Medtronic could have saved the public millions, or 
perhaps even $1 billion, in Medicare costs.17 
In 2008, the Supreme Court in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. made it 
more difficult for plaintiffs to bring common law claims against 
manufacturers of Class III medical devices.18  The Riegel court 
essentially preempted common law claims in which the manufacturer 
complied with FDA’s pre-market approval process.19  Plaintiffs, 
though, were not left without judicial recourse.  The Court made clear 
that parallel claims or state-law claims premised on an FDA violation 
escape preemption.20  However, the “contours of the parallel claim 
exception were not addressed in Riegel and are as-yet ill-defined.”21  
Consequently, lower courts have adopted conflicting interpretations 
of the parallel claim exception, especially in regards to two issues.22 
One issue that has plagued lower courts is whether a plaintiff must 
allege a violation of a generally applicable or a device-specific federal 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See id. at 4. 
 13. See id. 
 14. Id.  Making sure the leads do not fail “is a costly procedure, and each 
procedure carries the risk of complications or even death.  Removing the defective 
lead is especially difficult because leads become imbedded into the surrounding tissue 
after they are positioned into the veins connecting to the heart.” Id. 
 15. TOLLEY supra note 6, at 2–3; Chang, supra note 8, at 301–02. 
 16. Chang, supra note 8. 
 17. Id. at 298. 
 18. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321 (2008).  Under Riegel, a state law 
claim is expressly preempted if it imposes requirements that are “different from or in 
addition to” federal requirements. Id. 
 19. See id. at 332. 
 20. See id. at 328. 
 21. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 
1204 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 22. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9–11, Medtronic, Inc. v. Stengel, 134 S. 
Ct. 375 (2013) (No. 12-1351). 
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requirement to avoid express preemption.23  While the Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that the federal requirement 
can be generally applicable, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have 
held that the requirement must be device-specific.24 
Another issue that has been divisive for lower courts is whether 
traditional state tort law claims are impliedly preempted by Buckman 
Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee.25  The Sixth and Eighth Circuits 
have impliedly preempted state tort law claims premised on a FDA 
violation.  By contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have 
held that such state law tort claims are not impliedly preempted.26  
For the lower federal courts to be divided over this issue of federal 
law is problematic, as it is in contravention of Congress’s intent to 
create a uniform framework for regulating medical devices.27 
Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc. raised the very issues that have plagued 
lower courts, namely, whether a claim that a manufacturer failed to 
report adverse events fits within the parallel claim exception or is 
preempted, either expressly or impliedly.28  The district court held 
that plaintiff’s claims were expressly and impliedly preempted.29  The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed, but then the full court reversed en banc.30  
Medtronic filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the Supreme 
Court should clarify the contours of the parallel claim exception and 
overrule the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision.31  Recently, the 
Supreme Court denied Medtronic’s petition for certiorari, and thus 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. at 10. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. at 11; Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 
(2001) (holding that plaintiff’s fraud on the FDA claim was impliedly preempted by 
the statutory scheme of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 19.  Congress enacted a preemption provision in the Medical Device 
Amendments of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act because states enacted varying 
laws in response to medical device failures in the mid-1970s such as the Dalkon 
Shield failures. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 45–46 (1976); Robert B. Leflar & 
Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of Products Liability 
Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 703–04 (1997). 
 28. See generally Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 29. Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., CV 10-318-TUC-RCC, 2010 WL 4483970 (D. Ariz. 
Nov. 9, 2010), aff’d, 676 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 
1121 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 30. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1234; Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 676 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th 
Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, 704 
F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 31. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 9–11. 
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the confusion surrounding the parallel claim exception continues.32  
Although the Supreme Court’s rationale for denial of certiorari is 
unclear, it could have been persuaded by the respondents’ arguments 
that Medtronic did not properly raise an argument below, or that the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision lacked finality.33 
This Note explores the split amongst the Circuits involving 
preemption of Class III medical devices and concludes that the 
Supreme Court should bridge the split in the near future.  Part I 
provides a background on the FDA’s statutory scheme and the 
Supreme Court’s implied and express preemption doctrine in the 
context of medical devices.  It also explores how claims that fit within 
the parallel claim exception avoid express or implied preemption.  
Part II of this Note explores the diverging interpretations to parallel 
claims that lower courts have adopted.  Specifically, some courts have 
held that state law tort claims premised on an industry-wide violation 
are expressly or impliedly preempted, whereas others have held that 
such claims avoid preemption entirely.  Part III outlines the 
arguments made in support and opposition of certiorari in Stengel.  
Finally, Part IV of this Note concludes that, based on sound public 
policy and precedent, traditional state law claims premised on 
violations of FDA regulations should survive both express and 
implied preemption. 
I.  THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS AND THE PREEMPTION 
DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court decisions on preemption, as well as those of 
the lower courts, are based on their interpretations of The Medical 
Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act (FDCA).  Accordingly, an understanding of the 
MDA’s complex regulatory framework is crucial to understanding 
these court decisions.34 
                                                                                                                 
 32. See Michael Walsh, The Preemption Pendulum: The Supreme Court Punts 
Stengel v. Medtronic, STRASBURGER FOOD & DRUG L. BLOG, (June 24, 2012), 
http://www.strasburger.com/preemption-pendulum-supreme-court-punts-stengel-v-
medtronic/. 
 33. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 7–9, 20–22, Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Stengel, 134 S. Ct. 375 (2013) (No. 12-1351). 
 34. J. David Prince, The Puzzle of Parallel Claims, Preemption, and Pleading the 
Particulars, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1034, 1038–39 (2013). 
2014] PARALLEL CLAIM EXCEPTION 297 
A. The FDA Approval Process 
The MDA divides medical devices into three categories.35  Class I 
devices, such as bandages, do “not present an unreasonable risk of 
injury” and thus are subject to only general controls, such as labeling 
requirements.36  Class II devices pose a greater risk than Class I 
devices, and are subject to special controls, such as performance 
standards and post-market surveillance measures.37  Class III devices, 
such as implantable pacemaker pulse generators and heart valves, 
pose the greatest risk and are subject to extensive regulations.38  A 
device is classified as Class III if it cannot be classified as a Class I or 
Class II device, and the device is (1) “purported or represented to be 
for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is 
of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human 
health,” or (2) “presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or 
injury.”39 
Class III medical devices must undergo a rigorous pre-market 
approval (PMA) process.40  Manufacturers must submit the following 
to the FDA regarding Class III medical devices: (1) full reports of all 
studies that have been published or should reasonably be known by 
the manufacturer; (2) a full statement of the components, ingredients, 
and properties of the device; (3) a full description of the methods, 
facilities, and controls used for manufacturing, processing, and, when 
relevant, packing and installing the device; (4) samples or device 
components as requested by the FDA; and (5) a specimen of 
proposed labeling.41  The FDA then reviews all of this information 
and “weig[hs] any probable benefit to health from the use of the 
device against any probable risk of injury or illness from such use.”42  
According to the Supreme Court, the FDA spends an average of 1200 
                                                                                                                 
 35. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012). 
 36. Id. §360c(a)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 880.6230, 880.5075 (2014); see also Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316 (2008). 
 37. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B); 21 C.F.R. §§ 880.5860 (2014); 21 C.F.R. § 
884.5460 (2014); see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317. 
 38. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II); 21 C.F.R. § 870.3610 (2014); see, e.g., 
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317. 
 39. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317. 
 40. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996); see also Prince, supra note 
34, at 1039. 
 41. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1); see also Riegel, 522 U.S. at 318.  For the specific 
reporting rules required in PMA application, see 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2014). 
 42. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(C); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318. 
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hours on each PMA submission.43  After completing its review, the 
FDA can grant, deny, or condition approval on adherence to 
performance standards.44  The FDA only approves the device if it 
finds that (a) there is a “reasonable assurance” of the device’s “safety 
and effectiveness,” and (b) the proposed labeling is neither false nor 
misleading.45 
The PMA process is a rigorous one, but there are three ways a 
device can avoid it.  The first exception “grandfathers in” devices that 
are manufactured prior to the MDA’s effective date of May 28, 
1976.46  Devices manufactured prior to the MDA’s effective date can 
remain on the market until the FDA promulgates a regulation 
requiring pre-market approval.47  The second exception allows for 
devices that are “substantially equivalent” to devices on the market 
prior to enactment of the MDA to go through an expedited § 510(k) 
process instead of PMA.48  Most Class III devices enter the market 
through § 510(k) where they are reviewed by the FDA for 
equivalence but not for safety and effectiveness.49  The third 
exception, known as the investigational device exemption (IDE), 
allows experts to use unapproved devices in research trials involving 
human subjects.50 
Once a device receives pre-market approval, it is still subject to 
regulatory constraints.51  After pre-market approval, the 
manufacturer cannot, without FDA permission: change the design, 
the manufacturing process, labeling, or any other attribute that would 
affect safety or effectiveness of the device.52  If a manufacturer wants 
to make such a change it must file, and the FDA must approve, a 
supplemental PMA.53  The supplemental PMA application is 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477.  Before granting PMA approval, the FDA can also 
employ outside experts to review the information or request additional information 
from the manufacturer. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(G); 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(a) (2014). 
 44. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e; 21 C.F.R. § 861.1(b)(3) (2014); see also Riegel, 522 U.S. 
at 319. 
 45. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318. 
 46. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1); Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317. 
 47. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(f)(1), 360e(b)(1). 
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A). 
 49. “Most new Class III devices enter the market through § 510(k).  In 2005, for 
example, the FDA authorized the marketing of 3,148 devices under § 510(k) and 
granted premarket approval to just 32 devices.” Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317 (citing PETER 
HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 992 (3d ed. 2007)). 
 50. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g). 
 51. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319. 
 52. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i); see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319. 
 53. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i). 
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“evaluated under largely the same criteria as an initial application.”54  
However, certain changes to a device’s label after pre-market 
approval do not require FDA approval.55  For instance, the “changes 
being effected” regulation (CBE) allows a manufacturer to put in 
effect labeling changes: 
(i) that add or strengthen a contradiction warning, precaution, or 
information about an adverse reaction for which there is reasonable 
evidence of a causal association . . . (ii) that add or strengthen an 
instruction that is intended to enhance the safe use of the 
device . . . (iii) that delete misleading, false, or unsupported 
indications.56 
In addition to the pre-market approval requirements, a 
manufacturer must also comply with the MDA’s post-approval 
reporting requirements.57  These reporting requirements compel a 
manufacturer to submit reports that include: (1) clinical investigations 
or scientific studies concerning the device, which is known or should 
be known by the manufacturer;58 and (2) incidents in which a device 
“[m]ay have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury” or 
malfunctioned in a manner that “would be likely to cause or 
contribute to a death or serious injury, if the malfunction were to 
recur.”59  Manufacturers must report death, serious injury, or 
malfunction to the FDA within thirty calendar days after the 
manufacturer “receive[s] or otherwise become[s] aware of 
information, from any source.”60  The FDA can also obtain this post-
approval information from other entities besides the manufacturer.  
For instance, the MDA requires physicians, hospitals, surgical 
facilities, and other health-service providers to report deaths or 
serious injury associated with a Class III medical device.61 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319; see 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2014) (“[A]ll procedures and 
actions that apply to an application under § 814.20 also apply to PMA supplements 
except that the information required in a supplement is limited to that needed to 
support the change.”). 
 55. Without FDA approval, a manufacturer may place into effect “i) labeling 
changes that add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or 
information about an adverse reaction for which there is reasonable evidence of a 
causal association” or “ii) [l]abeling changes that add or strengthen an instruction 
that is intended to enhance the safe use of the device.” 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(d)(2)(i)–
(iii). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 360i. 
 58. See 21 C.F.R. § 814.84 (2014). 
 59. 21 C.F.R. § 803.50 (2014). 
 60. Id. 
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 360i. 
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The FDA’s surveillance system can generally be classified as 
passive because it requires manufacturers to do their own due 
diligence.62  However, the FDA does have a few affirmative 
obligations.  First, the FDA is required to inspect domestic 
manufacturing facilities of Class III devices once every two years.63  
Second, the FDA has the authority to withdraw PMA based on newly 
reported or existing information, and the FDA must withdraw PMA 
if it determines that the device is unsafe or ineffective under the 
conditions of its labeling.64  In addition, the FDA can order a label 
change based on newly acquired information;65 if the FDA 
determines that the device poses an “unreasonable risk of substantial 
harm to the public,” the FDA can require the manufacturer to notify 
affected individuals, or repair, replace, or refund the device.66 
B. The Preemption Doctrine 
In addition to pre-approval and post-approval requirements, the 
MDA also contains a preemption provision.  The preemption 
provision set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) states that: 
[N]o State . . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to a 
device intended for human use any requirement— 
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement 
applicable under this chapter to the device, and 
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any 
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device 
under this chapter [the FDCA].67 
The preemption doctrine is derived from the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution, which states that the “Laws of the 
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”68  The Supreme Court has recognized that federal 
                                                                                                                 
 62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-370T, MEDICAL DEVICES 
SHORTCOMINGS IN FDA’S PREMARKET REVIEW, POSTMARKET SURVEILLANCE, AND 
INSPECTIONS OF DEVICE MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS 14 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/122801.pdf. 
 63. 21 U.S.C. § 360(h). 
 64. Id. § 360e(e)(1); § 360h(e); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 
319–20 (2008). 
 65. 21 U.S.C. § 360f(a)(2). 
 66. Id. § 360h(a)–(b). 
 67. Id. § 360k. 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
2014] PARALLEL CLAIM EXCEPTION 301 
law can preempt state law either expressly or impliedly.69  Express 
preemption occurs when the text of a federal statute clearly preempts 
state law.70  Implied preemption occurs when Congress intended the 
federal statutory scheme to “occupy the field” (field preemption), or 
when state law conflicts with federal law (conflict preemption).71  The 
implied preemption analysis for medical device claims falls within the 
category of conflict preemption, of which there are two kinds.72  First, 
state law is impliedly preempted if it is physically impossible to 
comply with both state and federal law.73  Second, state law is 
impliedly preempted if that state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”74  The Supreme Court has analyzed claims involving 
medical devices under the doctrine of express preemption, as well as 
implied conflict/obstacle preemption.75 
There are three influential Supreme Court decisions on the 
preemption doctrine which involve medical device claims: Medtronic, 
Inc. v. Lohr,76 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Committee,77 and 
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.78  Due in large part to the last two decisions 
mentioned, preemption has become a major defense in the field of 
medical devices.79  However, these decisions have also created a 
narrow gap, known as the parallel claim exception, through which 
state law claims can fit to avoid preemption.80 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: 
Preemption of Medical Device “Parallel Claims”, 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 159, 
163 (2013). 
 70. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241–42 (1947); see also 
Eggen, supra note 69, at 163–64. 
 71. Eggen, supra note 69, at 164. 
 72. Id. 
 73. “[T]he Court has found pre-emption where compliance with both federal and 
state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce.” 
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589 (2009); see also Eggen, supra note 69, at 164. 
 74. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 589 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 75. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321–22 (2008) (undertaking an 
express preemption analysis); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 
348 (2001) (undertaking an implied conflict/ obstacle preemption analysis); see also 
Eggen, supra note 69, at 167. 
 76. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 77. 531 U.S. 341. 
 78. 552 U.S. 312. 
 79. Prince, supra note 34, at 1038. 
 80. See generally, Eggen, supra note 69, at 160–61. 
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1. The Supreme Court’s Express Preemption Doctrine 
a. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 
The Supreme Court first addressed the scope of the MDA’s 
preemption provision in Lohr.81  The Supreme Court, applying a 
presumption against preemption, ruled that Lohr’s common law 
claims against a device approved through § 510(k) are not 
preempted.82  The presumption against preemption is used in a field 
traditionally occupied by the states.83  In such a field, the Court 
“start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”84 
In Lohr, Medtronic manufactured a Model 4011 pacemaker that 
was approved by the FDA through the expedited § 510(k) process 
requiring “substantial equivalence” to an already approved device.85  
In 1990, Lora Lohr’s Model 4011 pacemaker failed, allegedly due to a 
defective lead.86 
Lohr and her husband sued under theories of negligence and strict 
liability.87  The Court held that the Lohrs’ claims were not preempted 
because § 510(k) approval did not amount to a federal requirement.88  
According to the Court, the § 510(k) process did not impose a federal 
requirement because the FDA had only made a determination of 
“substantial equivalence,” not a determination of “safety and 
effectiveness.”89  “[S]ubstantial equivalence determinations provide 
little protection to the public.  These determinations simply compare 
a post–1976 device to a pre–1976 device to ascertain whether the later 
device is no more dangerous and no less effective than the earlier 
device.”90 
Medtronic argued that the Lohrs’ claims should be preempted 
because it complied with Current Good Manufacturing Practices 
(CGMPs), which impose generalized duties on all manufacturers of 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Medical Devices and Preemption: A Defense of 
Parallel Claims Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific FDA Regulations, 86 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1196, 1203 (2011). 
 82. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 494 (1996). 
 83. Id. at 485. 
 84. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 85. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 480–81. 
 86. Id. at 481. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 502; see also Eggen, supra note 69, at 167. 
 89. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493. 
 90. Id. 
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medical devices.91  The Court rejected Medtronic’s argument and held 
that the generalized duties imposed by the CGMP are not specific 
enough to preempt the Lohrs’ common law claims.92  Therefore, the 
Lohrs’ state law claims regarding a device that went through § 510(k) 
were not preempted because there was no conflict with the FDA’s 
rules relating to manufacturing and labeling.93 
b. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 
Twelve years later, the Supreme Court ruled that claims regarding 
medical devices that went through the full PMA have a preemptive 
effect.  During a coronary angioplasty in 1996, Medtronic’s Evergreen 
Balloon Catheter was inserted into Charles Riegel’s artery to inflate 
the artery like a balloon in hopes of dilating it.94  On the fifth 
inflation, the catheter burst, and as a result, Riegel suffered severe 
and permanent injuries.95  Charles and his wife Donna sued in the 
Northern District of New York seeking compensatory damages.96  
They alleged that the catheter inserted into Riegel was designed, 
labeled, and manufactured in violation of New York common law.97  
In Riegel, the Supreme Court expressly preempted plaintiffs’ 
common law claims involving an Evergreen Balloon Catheter, which 
went through the full PMA process.98 
In reaching the conclusion that the Riegels’ state law claims were 
expressly preempted, the Court undertook a two step analysis.99  
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id. at 497–98.  The CGMPs “govern the methods . . . for, the design, 
manufacture, packaging, labeling, storage, installation, and servicing of all finished 
devices.” 21 C.F.R. § 820.1 (2014).  The CGMPs were “established to be flexible in 
order to allow each manufacturer to decide individually how to best implement the 
necessary controls.” Facts About Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMPs), 
US FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/
manufacturing/ucm169105.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2014). 
 92. The generality of the CGMPs “make this quite unlike a case in which the 
Federal Government has weighed the competing interests.”  CGMPs “reflect 
important but entirely generic concerns about device regulation generally, not the 
sort of concerns regarding a specific device or field of device regulation that the 
statute or regulations were designed to protect from potentially contradictory state 
requirements.” Lohr, 518 U.S. at 501. 
 93. See id. at 501. 
 94. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008); Prince, supra note 34, at 
1044. 
 95. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 320. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 
2d 1147, 1151 (D. Minn. 2009), aff’d, 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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First, the Court had to determine whether the PMA imposed 
“requirements” of “safety and effectiveness” under the MDA.  The 
Court held that PMA approval does impose “requirements” because, 
as the rigorous PMA process indicates, the FDA will only approve of 
a device if it “offers a reasonable assurance of safety and 
effectiveness.”100  Second, the Court had to decide whether plaintiffs’ 
common law claims imposed requirements that were “different from 
or in addition to” the PMA requirements imposed under § 360k(a).  
The Court held that common law claims constitute “requirements” 
because the legal duty is imposed and the common law damages 
remedy is “a potent method of governing conduct and controlling 
policy.”101  The Court then concluded that the state law common law 
requirements are “different from or in addition to” those imposed by 
federal law.102  This is because a jury could weigh the risks and 
benefits of a device in a way that conflicts with the FDA decision 
made during PMA that the device was safe and effective.103  For these 
reasons, the Riegels’ state law claims were expressly preempted by § 
360k. 
2. The Parallel Claim Exception Carved Out in Riegel and Lohr 
Riegel effectively precluded many common law tort law claims.  
However, the Riegel court made clear that it was only preempting 
common law claims in which the manufacturer “violated state law tort 
duties notwithstanding compliance with the relevant federal 
requirements.”104  The Supreme Court recognized in both Riegel and 
Lohr that claims premised on a violation of a federal requirement 
could survive preemption.105  In Lohr, the Court said “nothing in § 
360k denies [the state] the right to provide a traditional damages 
remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties 
parallel federal requirements.”106  The Riegel Court reaffirmed this 
view when it said: “Section 360k does not prevent a State from 
providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of 
FDA regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Riegel, 522 U.S. at 323.  “Premarket approval . . . imposes ‘requirements’ 
under the MDA.” Id. at 322. 
 101. Id. at 324 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992)). 
 102. Id. at 330. 
 103. Id. at 325. 
 104. Id. at 330 (emphasis added); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 552 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). 
 105. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996). 
 106. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495. 
2014] PARALLEL CLAIM EXCEPTION 305 
add to, federal requirements.”107  Hence, parallel claims—that is, state 
law claims premised on a violation of federal law—are not expressly 
preempted because such claims are not in conflict with federal 
requirements.108 
In a more recent decision involving generic drugs, the Supreme 
Court also seemed to leave the door open for parallel claims.  In 
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, the Court held that plaintiff’s 
design defect claim involving a generic drug was impliedly preempted 
due to the impossibility of complying with both state and federal 
law.109  The Court found that plaintiff’s claim, which was premised on 
the theory that the manufacturer should have changed its labeling, 
conflicted with FDCA regulations prohibiting a generic drug 
manufacturer from unilaterally changing its labels.110  However, the 
Court did note that it was “not address[ing] state design-defect claims 
that parallel the federal misbranding statute.”111  One claim that could 
fall within the parallel claim exception would be if the generic drug 
manufacturer violated the federal misbranding statute by failing to 
pull a dangerous drug from the market.112 
B. Implied Preemption 
Although a claim that falls within the parallel claim exception 
survives express preemption, such a claim may still be impliedly 
preempted.113  In 2001, the Supreme Court held in Buckman that 
plaintiff’s claims survived express preemption but failed to escape 
implied preemption.114  In Buckman, the Court looked beyond the 
text and used an implied conflict preemption analysis.115  Specifically, 
the Buckman court undertook an obstacle preemption analysis.116 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330. 
 108. See generally id. at 312; see also Eggen, supra note 69, at 167. 
 109. 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2477. 
 110. Id. at 2473. 
 111. Id. at 2477 n.4. 
 112. See id.; see also Brian Wolfman & Anne King, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. 
Bartlett and Its Implications, U.S. L. WK., Nov. 5, 2013, at 1, 8, available at 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2306&context=fac
pub. 
 113. “Thus, although [Riegel v.] Medtronic can be read to allow certain state-law 
causes of actions that parallel federal safety requirements, it does not and cannot 
stand for the proposition that any violation of the FDCA will support a state-law 
claim.” Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001). 
 114. See id. at 347–48. 
 115. Eggen, supra note 69, at 168 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941)). 
 116. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350. 
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In Buckman, the FDA twice denied the manufacturer’s § 510(k) 
application for use of a bone screw in spinal surgery.117  The 
manufacturer submitted a third application seeking approval for the 
bone screws for use in the long bones of the arms and legs.118  A 
regulatory consultant of the manufacturer represented to the FDA 
that the bone screws would only be used in long bone surgery.119  
Thousands of plaintiffs sued the regulatory consultant alleging that 
the consultant, Buckman, made fraudulent representations to the 
FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws.120 
The Court treated the claims as within the parallel claim exception 
because “‘fraud on the FDA’ constitutes a violation of both federal 
and state law.”121  Nonetheless, the Court held that plaintiffs’ claims 
were impliedly preempted.122  As a threshold matter, the Court 
refused to apply the presumption against preemption because 
“policing fraud against federal agencies is hardly ‘a field which the 
States have traditionally occupied.’”123  The Court then held that the 
FDA has exclusive authority to enforce claims of fraud.  It construed 
21 U.S.C. § 337, which provides that enforcement of FDCA violations 
“shall be by and in the name of the United States,” as barring private 
action of plaintiff’s claims.  The Court also explained that the § 510(k) 
approval process created a “comprehensive scheme for determining 
whether an applicant has demonstrated that a product is substantially 
equivalent to a predicate device”124  First, the manufacturer must 
comply with FDA disclosure requirements such as submitting labeling 
and advertisements to the FDA.125  Secondly, according to the Court, 
the FDA is given ample enforcement power to deter or punish fraud, 
including: the power to investigate fraud, seek injunctive relief and 
civil penalties, seize the device, and pursue criminal sanctions.126 
After determining that the FDA has ample authority to police 
fraud, the Court concluded that the “state law fraud-on-the-FDA 
claims inevitability conflict with the FDA’s responsibility to police 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. at 346. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 346–47. 
 121. Id. at 348; Eggen, supra note 69, at 169. 
 122. “[T]here is clear evidence here that Congress intended that the MDA be 
enforced exclusively by the Federal Government.” Buckman, 531 U.S. at 342. 
 123. Id. at 347 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 124. Id. at 348. 
 125. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 807.87(e)–(f) (2014)). 
 126. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 349; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333(a), 333(f)(1)(A), 
334(a)(2)(D), 372 (2012). 
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fraud.”127  The court gave several public policy reasons why there 
would be an inevitable conflict.  First, complying with the FDA’s 
detailed regulatory scheme and the tort regimes of fifty states would 
be dramatically burdensome for the manufacturer.128  Second, 
manufacturers may be deterred from applying for § 510(k) approval 
out of fear that they will be “exposed to unpredictable civil 
liability.”129  Third, applicants worried that their disclosures will not 
be sufficient in state court, may submit a deluge of unnecessary 
information to the FDA, which would delay the “comparatively 
speedy § 510(k) process.”130  Delays in § 510(k) approval would, in 
turn, impede competition among devices and delay the prescription of 
beneficial off-label uses.131 
The question left open after Buckman is to what extent common 
law claims that parallel federal law are impliedly preempted.132  The 
Buckman court stated that some, but not all, parallel claims are 
impliedly preempted when it said, “although Medtronic [v. Lohr] can 
be read to allow certain state-law causes of actions that parallel 
federal safety requirements, it does not and cannot stand for the 
proposition that any violation of the FDCA will support a state-law 
claim.”133  According to the Buckman court, the difference between 
Lohr, in which the claims were not preempted, and Buckman, in 
which they were preempted, was the source of the cause of action.134  
In Lohr, the claim was based on traditional state law for failure to use 
reasonable care, whereas in Buckman, the Court found that the 
causes of action “exist solely by virtue of the FDCA disclosure 
requirements.”135 
C. The Narrow Gap 
Together, Riegel, Lohr, and Buckman, “create a narrow gap 
through which a plaintiff’s state-law claim must fit through to escape 
express or implied preemption.”136  The claim must allege a violation 
of a federal requirement to avoid express preemption under Riegel, 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 351. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Eggen, supra note 69, at 173; see also Prince, supra note 34, at 1071. 
 133. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353. 
 134. Prince, supra note 34, at 1071. 
 135. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353. 
 136. Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009). 
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but even if it does, it must then avoid the ambit of Buckman’s implied 
preemption doctrine.137  However, the Supreme Court did not 
provide much guidance on what exactly fits through the narrow gap 
that they created through this triad of cases.138  The result is that 
lower courts have not treated the narrow gap with consistency or 
uniformity.139 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that judges often base their 
preemption decision off of extralegal factors such as their ideology, 
the court they sit on, and the residence of the litigants.140  According 
to Professor Jean Eggen, courts have merged the distinct doctrines of 
express and implied preemption into a “unitary standard,” such that it 
is now a matter of “policy and discretion,” which standard courts 
choose to preempt plaintiff’s claim.141  Supreme Court Justices 
Kennedy and Thomas have acknowledged that the preemption 
doctrine can result in a “freewheeling” judicial inquiry.142  
Consequently, there is no uniform judicial inquiry of the preemption 
doctrine amongst the lower courts. 
II.  DIVERGING DOCTRINE IN THE WAKE OF RIEGEL 
A. Genuine Equivalency 
In the wake of Riegel, lower courts have differed on exactly which 
claims fit through this narrow gap to survive preemption.  A threshold 
issue is what exactly constitutes a parallel claim.  As established in 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC and McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., to 
                                                                                                                 
 137. 27 MINN. PRAC., PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 9.11.50 (2014). 
 138. The Eighth Circuit has said that “[t]he contours of the parallel claim exception 
were not addressed in Riegel and are as-yet ill-defined.” In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint 
Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 139. Eggen, supra note 69, at 172. 
 140. According to a study conducted by Samuel Raymond, a New York University 
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 141. Eggen, supra note 69, at 171–72; see also Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Mature 
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Protection, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 95, 115, 133 (2009). 
 142. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 
505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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fit within the parallel claim exception and thus avoid express 
preemption, plaintiff must show that the state and federal 
requirements are “genuinely equivalent.”143  This means that a state 
law claim must be premised on a duty that is the same as the duty 
imposed by the FDCA.144 
For instance, in Bates the Supreme Court held that “a state-law 
labeling requirement must in fact be equivalent to a requirement 
under FIFRA [the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act] in order to survive pre-emption.”145  In Bates, Dow allegedly 
recommended the use of its pesticide in all soils even though Dow 
knew or should have known that the pesticide would stunt the growth 
of peanuts in soils with pH levels greater than 7.0.146  Texas peanut 
farmers brought fraud and failure-to-warn claims against Dow.147  The 
farmers’ fraud and failure-to-warn claims were parallel claims 
because they were premised on violations of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) misbranding provisions.148  
The Court held that the common law duties plaintiff sought to impose 
were equivalent to the FIFRA’s requirements that a pesticide label 
not contain false or misleading statements or inadequate warnings.  
Although Bates involved FIFRA, the Court found that this “parallel 
requirements” reading of the statute “finds strong support in 
Medtronic v. Lohr.”149 
Although there is no Supreme Court case establishing the genuine 
equivalency standard for medical devices, the Seventh Circuit has 
applied Bates to the medical device context, and other circuits have 
followed suit.150  In McMullen, the Seventh Circuit held that: 
[I]n order for a state requirement to be parallel to a federal 
requirement . . . the plaintiff must show that the requirements are 
‘genuinely equivalent.’  State and federal requirements are not 
                                                                                                                 
 143. McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 144. Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (D. Minn. 2009); Prince, supra 
note 34, at 1051. 
 145. 544 U.S. at 453. 
 146. Id. at 434–35. 
 147. Id. at 446. 
 148. See id. at 446–48.  FIFRA’s misbranding provisions require that a pesticide 
label not contain false or misleading statements or inadequate instructions or 
warning.  Id. at 447 (citing 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(q)(1)(A); (q)(1)(F)(G)).    
 149. Id. at 432. 
 150. McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005); see also 
Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow Int’l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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genuinely equivalent if a manufacturer could be held liable under 
the state law without having violated the federal law.151 
In other words, a state requirement is “different from or in 
addition to” when it is not genuinely equivalent to a federal 
requirement.152 
In contrast to Bates, the McMullen court held that the 
manufacturer’s alleged violation of a state requirement was not 
genuinely equivalent to the federal requirement allegedly violated.153  
Jack McMullen had two Medtronic Activa devices implanted in his 
brain to suppress tremors caused by his Parkinson’s disease.154  In 
March 2001, McMullen underwent dental surgery that involved use of 
diathermy.155  As a result of the diathermy, McMullen suffered severe 
brain damage.  In January 2001, Medtronic knew of an anecdotal 
report where the use of diathermy on a person with an implanted 
Activa allegedly caused brain damage.156  However, Medtronic did 
not strengthen its warning until May 2001.157  McMullen and his wife 
brought a state law failure-to-warn claim, alleging that Medtronic 
violated its state and federal duty by failing to strengthen its warning 
between January and March 2001.158 
The Seventh Circuit held that the McMullens’ state law claim was 
not genuinely equivalent to any FDCA violation and thus was 
expressly preempted.159  Under the FDCA, a manufacturer must 
obtain FDA approval to change warnings of an approved device but 
can temporarily amend its warnings pending FDA approval of the 
proposed changes.160  The court understood these FDA regulations as 
allowing but not requiring the manufacturer to change its warnings 
                                                                                                                 
 151. McMullen, 421 F.3d at 489 (citation omitted). 
 152. When “there are both state and federal requirements to this [same] effect, 
then the state requirements will not be different from, or in addition to, the federal 
requirements.” Id. at 488. 
 153. Id. at 490. 
 154. Id. at 484. 
 155. Id. at 485. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 485–86. 
 158. Id. at 486.  Plaintiffs argue McMullen violated two federal regulations.  “21 
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814.39, which permits manufacturers to enhance warnings pending approval of a 
proposed change to an earlier-approved warning.” Id. at 488–89. 
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 160. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2014). 
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upon learning of adverse events.161  In contrast to the FDCA, the 
state law duty would require the manufacturer to provide an 
additional warning between January and March 2001.162  Thus the 
court held that plaintiff’s state law claim was expressly preempted 
because it was not genuinely equivalent to the FDCA violations 
alleged.163 
B. General or Device-Specific Requirement 
Once it is established that the manufacturer violated a genuinely 
equivalent federal requirement, the question then becomes how 
specific that federal requirement must be.  Whether the plaintiff must 
plead a violation of a generally applicable requirement or whether 
that federal requirement must be specific to the particular device in 
question has led to a split amongst the circuits.164  The Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that a common law claim 
premised on a generally applicable requirement or industry-wide 
regulation survives preemption.  In contrast, the Eighth and Eleventh 
Circuits have expressly preempted claims premised on an industry-
wide regulation, and have instead demanded that the requirement be 
specific to the device in question. 
Device-specific requirements are requirements set forth in the pre-
market approval files.165  For example, a device-specific requirement 
could be a manufacturer’s representation in its PMA that each hip 
implant component be sterilized at a temperature of 800 degrees.166  
A federal requirement may also be more general, applying to the 
medical device industry as a whole.  An example of such a generally 
applicable requirement is the Current Good Manufacturing Practices 
(CGMPs) set forth in the Quality System Regulation (QSR).167  The 
CGMPs “govern the methods used in . . . the design, manufacture, 
packaging, labeling, storage, installation, and servicing of all finished 
                                                                                                                 
 161. McMullen, 421 F.3d at 489. 
 162. Id. at 490. 
 163. Id. at 489–90. 
 164. Prince, supra note 34, at 1054. 
 165. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 
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devices.”168  The CGMPs were “established to be flexible in order to 
allow each manufacturer to decide individually how to best 
implement the necessary controls.”169  Another example of a 
generally applicable requirement is the Medical Device Reporting 
requirements (MDRs), which require manufacturers to report to the 
FDA when they become aware of information that reasonably 
suggests that their device may have caused serious injuries or 
malfunctions.170 
How specific the requirement must be to survive preemption is so 
bound up with issues of pleading that it is hard to separate the two.171  
Plaintiffs are now held to a heightened pleading standard due to the 
Supreme Court decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.172  Prior to Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff was held 
to a notice pleading standard, where his claims would not be 
dismissed under 12(b)(6) unless the plaintiff could “prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”173  
However, in Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court re-interpreted 
the pleading requirements of Rule 8 to require that the claim be 
“plausible on its face.”174  These decisions raised the pleading 
standard from “possible” to “plausible.”175  Plaintiffs can no longer 
rely on “labels and conclusions” or “formalistic recitations” to survive 
a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but, rather, they must plead some facts 
that support their allegation.176  Courts have relied on Twombly and 
Iqbal, in addition to Riegel, to dismiss parallel claims against medical 
devices.177 
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Courts are divided on how specific a plaintiff must be in pleading 
claims against a Class III medical device manufacturer.  The Eighth 
and Eleventh Circuits have held that only federal requirements that 
are specific to the device in question survive dismissal.  In In re 
Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Product Liability Litigation 
(Sprint Fidelis), plaintiffs in a multidistrict litigation action alleged 
that leads, small wires connecting implantable cardiac defibrillators, 
were prone to fracture, causing patients to suffer unnecessary 
shocks.178  The FDA ultimately issued a Class I recall of the leads, but 
at the time of the recall, over 150,000 leads were still implanted in 
patients.179  Plaintiffs brought a manufacturing defect claim asserting 
that the welding technique used to affix the leads violated 21 U.S.C. § 
351.180  Section 351 states that a product is adulterated if not in 
conformity with the CGMPs.181 
The District Court of Minnesota concluded that the “general 
allegations of failure to comply with the CGMPs . . . do not save these 
claims from preemption under § 360k because plaintiffs failed to 
identify any specific requirement in the PMA approval.”182  Given 
“[t]he flexibility inherent in the CGMPs and QSR,” plaintiff’s state 
law claim would impose requirements that are “different from, or in 
addition to” the CGMPs/QSR.183  According to the court, plaintiff 
“cannot simply incant the magic words ‘[the defendant] violated FDA 
regulations’ to avoid preemption.”184 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court’s application 
of Twombly held them to an impossible pleading standard because 
specific requirements in PMA approval are not accessible without 
discovery.185  The Eighth Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument and 
affirmed the district court, holding that the plaintiff “simply failed to 
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adequately plead that Medtronic violated a federal requirement 
specific to the FDA’s PMA approval of this Class III device.”186 
The Eleventh Circuit has aligned with the Eighth Circuit’s position 
that the plaintiff must allege a device-specific requirement in the 
PMA.  In Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow International, Inc, an Arrow 
pump system was implanted into Linda Wolicki-Gables’ back to 
deliver pain medication.187  The connector of the pump was allegedly 
defective, resulting in Linda’s partial paraplegia.188  Linda and her 
husband brought manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure-to-
warn claims premised on Arrow’s failure to manufacture, design, and 
provide adequate warnings of the pump system in accordance with 
FDCA regulations.189  The plaintiffs further contended that because 
the manufacturer destroyed the connector, they were entitled to a 
presumption that the connector was not manufactured in accordance 
with FDA regulations.190  The Eleventh Circuit held that “to properly 
allege parallel claims, the complaint must set forth facts pointing to 
specific PMA requirements that have been violated.”191  The court 
found that the complaint did not “set forth any specific problem, or 
failure to comply with any FDA regulation that can be linked to the 
injury alleged.”192  According to the court, plaintiffs failed to properly 
allege parallel claims and therefore the claims were preempted.193 
Some district courts have issued similar rulings to those given by 
the Eleventh and Eighth Circuits.  For instance, the Eastern District 
of New York took a stance akin to these Circuits in Horowitz v. 
Stryker and Illaraza v. Medtronic, Inc.  In Horowitz v. Stryker, 
Stryker recalled some of its Trident hip implant systems due to 
dimensional anomalies of some of its component parts from 2006 to 
2007.194  In 2007, upon inspection of Stryker’s manufacturing facilities, 
the FDA issued two warning letters stating that the Trident System 
was adulterated within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 351 because it 
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failed to comply with the CGMPs.195  Plaintiff brought a 
manufacturing defect claim against Stryker premised on violations of 
the CGMPs.196  The Eastern District held that “reliance on 
[defendants’ violations of] CGMPs and QSR . . . does not save these 
claims from preemption . . . [as such requirements] are simply too 
generic, standing alone, to serve as the basis for [her] manufacturing-
defect claim[ ].”197  In Ilarraza v. Medtronic, Inc., the plaintiff brought 
a manufacturing defect claim against Medtronic alleging that 
Medtronic’s pump and catheter, which fractured inside the plaintiff, 
violated the GGMPs.198  The Eastern District held that CGMPs were 
left “intentionally vague and open-ended” so that the manufacturer 
can tailor the regulations to the safety and efficacy needs of their 
particular device.199  Therefore: 
[s]ince these regulations are open to a particular manufacturer’s 
interpretation, allowing them to serve as a basis for a claim would 
lead to differing safety requirements that might emanate from 
various lawsuits.  This would necessarily result in the imposition of 
standards that are “different from, or in addition to” those imposed 
by the MDA—precisely the result that the MDA preemption 
provision seeks to prevent.200 
The court in Illarraza similarly found plaintiff’s claims failed to 
withstand the pleading requirements of Twombly because plaintiff 
had “done nothing more tha[n] recite unsupported violations of 
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general regulations, and fail[ed] to tie such allegations to the injuries 
alleged.”201 
In all of the above-mentioned cases, the circuits or district courts 
seemed to take the view that plaintiff’s parallel claim must allege a 
violation of a specific requirement in the PMA to withstand Riegel 
and Twombly.  The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, 
however, have held that the plaintiff need not allege a device-specific 
requirement.202  In the opinions of those Circuits, alleging that the 
manufacturer violated a generally applicable federal requirement is 
adequate at the pleading stage.203 
In Bausch v. Stryker Corp., the Seventh Circuit was faced with 
parallel claims against the same implant system as in Horowitz, and 
yet it held that the claims survived dismissal.  Stryker’s Trident hip 
implant system was implanted in plaintiff’s body six days after the 
FDA issued a warning letter to Stryker stating that a component in 
the system was adulterated.204  Plaintiff alleged that the “Trident 
Acetabular Hip Systems were adulterated due to manufacturing 
methods that were not in conformity with industry and regulatory 
standards.”205  Stryker argued that plaintiff must allege a violation of 
a concrete, device-specific regulation, and thus plaintiff’s claims, 
premised on violations of the QSR and CGMPs, were too general to 
allow juries to enforce them. 206  The Seventh Circuit said “we do not 
see a sound legal basis for defendants’ proposal to distinguish 
between general requirements and ‘concrete, device-specific’ 
requirements.”207  The court gave several reasons to support this 
conclusion.  First, the distinction between general and specific 
requirements has no basis in the preemption provision of § 360(k).208  
Second, it is difficult for a plaintiff to plead a device-specific 
requirement because most of the PMA specifications are not 
accessible without discovery.209  Third, a general/specific distinction 
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would “leave injured patients without any remedy for a wide range of 
harmful violations of federal law.”210  Hence, the Bausch court, 
inapposite to the Horowitz court, found that a plaintiff’s claim should 
not be dismissed solely because it was based on a generally applicable 
requirement like the CGMPs.211 
The Sixth Circuit in Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics Inc. also held 
that a violation of a CGMP should withstand dismissal.212  In Howard, 
Sulzer allegedly used a manufacturing process that left lubricating 
machine oil on its knee implants, and as a result thousands of 
patients’ implants failed to bond with the bone.213  Sulzer discovered 
the problem and voluntarily recalled 40,000 implants.214  In a multi-
district litigation proceeding, plaintiffs asserted a negligence per se 
theory under Ohio law.215  The Howard court, contrary to the holding 
in Sprint Fidelis, where plaintiff did not identify a specific CGMP that 
was violated, cited a particular CGMP that “is not so vague as to be 
incapable of enforcement.”216  In particular, the CGMP provided that 
“where manufacturing material is reasonably expected to have an 
adverse effect on product quality, the manufacturer shall establish 
and maintain procedures . . . to ensure that it is removed or limited to 
an amount that does not adversely affect the device’s quality.”217  The 
violation of this CGMP, which can be read as requiring Sulzer to 
remove the oil that the manufacturing process left behind, was 
sufficient to survive preemption.218 
Similarly, in Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., the Fifth Circuit 
held that violations of the MDR, an industry-wide regulation like the 
CGMPs, withstood dismissal.219  In Hughes, Boston Scientific 
manufactured a device that treated excess uterine bleeding by 
circulating hot saline solution into the uterus.220  Hot liquid leaked 
from plaintiff’s device, allegedly causing the plaintiff to suffer a 
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second-degree burn.221  Boston Scientific developed an algorithm for 
reporting burn injuries, where first-degree burns were never reported 
to the FDA and some, but not all, second-degree burns were 
reported.222  Upon learning of these reporting practices, the FDA sent 
a warning letter to Boston Scientific to abandon the algorithm and 
begin reporting more burns.223  The plaintiff alleged that Boston 
Scientific, by failing to report these burns, violated the MDR, which 
requires manufacturers to report serious injuries and malfunctions to 
the FDA.224  The Fifth Circuit denied Boston Scientific’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff’s state-law failure-to-
warn claim premised on MDR violations was not preempted.225  The 
court stated “[a] factfinder could infer that a manufacturer’s failure to 
provide this information as required by FDA regulations is a parallel 
violation of the state duty to provide reasonable and adequate 
information about a device’s risks.”226 
About a year later, in Bass v. Stryker Corp., the Fifth Circuit 
adhered to its decision in Hughes and held plaintiff’s allegation of a 
generally applicable requirement avoids preemption.227  Bass involved 
claims alleging that Stryker’s Trident system was adulterated in 
violation of the CGMPs.228  Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that 
excessive manufacturing residuals in the Shell component prevented 
bony ingrowth, which resulted in a loose shell, thereby causing pain in 
the plaintiff’s hip.229  The Court held that: 
[T]he key distinction between complaints that withstand a motion to 
dismiss and those that do not is not reliance on the CGMPs but 
rather . . . a manufacturing defect caused by a violation of federal 
regulations and allegations connecting a defect in the manufacture 
of the specific device to that plaintiff’s specific injury.230 
The court in Bass found that plaintiff’s claim pleaded sufficient 
facts including: warning letters issued by the FDA, a voluntary recall 
by Stryker, and an injury consistent with excessive residuals.  
Therefore the court held that the complaint met Twombly’s 
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plausibility standard because it “specifie[d] with particularity what 
went wrong in the manufacturing process and cite[d] the relevant 
FDA manufacturing standards Stryker allegedly violated.”231  The 
Bass court rejected Stryker’s argument that plaintiff’s claim should be 
expressly preempted because it was too vague to be enforced by a 
jury.  The court reasoned that by the time the case was tried, the jury 
would have before it the PMA application that was approved by the 
FDA.232 
The Ninth Circuit has taken the Fifth Circuit’s position that a 
violation of the generally applicable MDRs survives dismissal.  In 
Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., for instance, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
plaintiff’s claim alleging that Medtronic failed to report adverse 
events in violation of the MDR survives dismissal.233  In Coleman v. 
Medtronic Inc., the California Court of Appeals followed the analysis 
of Stengel.234   
In Coleman, plaintiff suffered painful complications after posterior 
lumbar interbody fusion surgery, a form of spinal surgery, allegedly 
because Infuse, a device designed to strengthen the spine of 
individuals with degenerated vertebral discs, was used during the 
procedure.235  The FDA had only approved Infuse for anterior fusion 
surgery, and thus using Infuse during posterior fusion surgery was 
considered an off-label use.236  The plaintiff brought a failure-to-warn 
claim based on Medtronic’s failure to report adverse events 
associated with Infuse in posterior fusion surgery.237  Medtronic 
reported to the FDA that there were no adverse events, but according 
to the plaintiff there were adverse events in twenty to seventy percent 
of posterior fusion cases where Infuse was employed.238  The court 
held that the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim, which relied upon 
industry-wide violations of the MDR, withstood dismissal.239  The 
plaintiff also asserted a manufacturing defect claim alleging that the 
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plaintiff’s Infuse device was defective because it failed to comply with 
the CGMPs.240  The California Court of Appeals held that pleading a 
violation of CGMP is sufficient to withstand dismissal because 
alleging a specific PMA requirement is not possible without 
discovery.241 
1. Scope of Implied Preemption 
Not only do lower courts disagree about the scope of express 
preemption, but they also disagree about the scope of implied 
preemption.  The Supreme Court in Buckman drew a distinction 
between the case at bar, where plaintiff’s claims were impliedly 
preempted, and Lohr, where the plaintiff’s claims were not.242  In 
Lohr, the plaintiffs’ claims survived preemption because they were 
based on traditional state law theories of negligence.243  By contrast, 
in Buckman, the plaintiffs’ “fraud claims exist[ed] solely by virtue of 
the FDCA disclosure requirements.”244  It is clear from Buckman that 
not all claims avoid implied preemption.245  What is less clear after 
Buckman is exactly which claims, other than fraud-on-the-FDA 
claims, if any, are impliedly preempted.  The Sixth and Eighth 
Circuits have adopted an expansive view of Buckman to impliedly 
preempt traditional state law tort claims premised on FDA violations.  
By contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have limited 
Buckman’s scope to fraud-on-the-FDA claims, thereby allowing 
traditional state law tort claims premised on FDA violations to avoid 
implied preemption. 
In Sprint Fidelis, the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s failure-
to-warn claim, alleging that Medtronic did not accurately and timely 
submit adverse event reports in violation of the MDR, was impliedly 
preempted.246  The Court construed Buckman to require that 
“plaintiff must not be suing because the conduct violates the 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Id. at 316. 
 241. Id. at 317. 
 242. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001). 
 243. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohrs, 518 U.S. 470, 500–02 (2010); See also Buckman, 531 
U.S. 352–53. 
 244. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353. 
 245. Id. (“Although Medtronic can be read to allow certain state-law causes of 
actions that parallel federal safety requirements, it does not and cannot stand for the 
proposition that any violation of the FDCA will support a state-law claim.”). 
 246. In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 
1205 (8th Cir. 2010). 
2014] PARALLEL CLAIM EXCEPTION 321 
FDCA.”247  The Court found that the claim that Medtronic did not 
provide the FDA with sufficient information is “simply an attempt by 
private parties to enforce the MDA claims foreclosed by § 337(a) as 
construed in Buckman.”248 
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Cupek v. 
Medtronic, Inc., when it impliedly preempted plaintiff’s negligence 
per se claim.249  In a negligence per se claim, the plaintiff relies on a 
violation of a statute or regulation to establish duty and breach in 
negligence.250  In Cupek, a pre-Riegel case, plaintiffs alleged a 
negligence per se claim against Medtronic’s pacemaker leads based 
on Medtronic’s failure to comply with the FDA’s conditions of 
approval.251  The Sixth Circuit held that plaintiff’s claim was a 
“disguised fraud on the FDA claim” and therefore was impliedly 
preempted.252 
Like the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, various district courts have 
expanded Buckman beyond fraud-on-the FDA to impliedly preempt 
traditional state law tort claims.  In Lewkut v. Stryker Corp., the 
Southern District of Texas applied Buckman expansively to preempt 
Lewkut’s manufacturing defect claims.253  Lewkut alleged that 
Stryker’s hip implant system was adulterated in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 351(h) of the FDCA.254  To the extent that Lewkut alleged a parallel 
claim, the district court held that claim to be impliedly preempted 
because 21 U.S.C. § 337 “explicitly precludes private enforcement of 
federal laws regarding ‘adulterated’ devices.”255 
Similarly, in Wheeler v. DePuy Spine, Inc., the Southern District of 
Florida held that plaintiff’s negligence claim premised on violations of 
the FDCA was impliedly preempted.256  In Wheeler, the plaintiff 
suffered severe leg and back pain allegedly due to two implanted 
artificial discs.257  Plaintiff argued that DePuy violated the MDR by 
not accurately disclosing the number and extent of disc complications 
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to the FDA.258  The court held that “[a]lthough Plaintiff states that he 
is not bringing a fraud-on-the-FDA claim, the claim described by 
Plaintiff appears to be such a claim, and as such it should be 
addressed to the FDA.”259  As in Sprint Fidelis and Cupek, although 
the plaintiffs in Lewkut and Wheeler asserted traditional state law 
causes of action, both courts saw these claims as disguised fraud-on-
the-FDA claims. 
As in Wheeler and DePuy, in McClelland v. Medtronic, Inc. the 
district court for the Middle District of Florida impliedly preempted 
the plaintiff’s traditional state law tort claim.260  In McClelland, 
Breanne McCelland allegedly died from a defect in Medtronic’s 
EnPulse Model E1DR21 pacemaker.261  The plaintiff, decedent’s 
mother, alleged that prior to decedent’s death, Medtronic became 
aware that some of its pacemakers, including the E1DR21, were 
defective.  Specifically, Medtronic knew that the E1DR21 was likely 
to “cause intense cardiac symptoms and fail[ure] to properly regulate 
cardiac rhythm.”262  The plaintiff brought negligence per se and 
failure-to-warn claims premised on Medtronic’s failure to accurately 
and timely report E1DR21 incidents in violation of the FDCA.  The 
district court stated: 
[T]he [MDA] provides that all actions to enforce the FDA 
requirements “shall be by and in the name of the United 
States[.]” . . .  In Buckman, the United States Supreme Court 
construed § 337(a) as impliedly preempting suits by private litigants 
“for noncompliance with the medical device provisions.”  In other 
words, claims based upon FDCA disclosure requirements, rather 
than traditional state tort law are impliedly preempted.263 
The McClelland court seemed to interpret Buckman very liberally 
to impliedly preempt all common law claims that are based on FDCA 
disclosure requirements.264  Accordingly, both McClelland’s 
negligence per se and failure-to-warn claims were impliedly 
preempted. 
The Middle District of Florida explained that McClelland’s failure-
to-warn claim was impliedly preempted because it was not based on 
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common law, but rather based on Defendant’s duty to warn pursuant 
to the FDCA and FDA regulations.265  The court did note that the 
plaintiff could have avoided implied preemption if she alleged that 
Medtronic breached a duty to the decedent instead of to the FDA.266  
However, such an allegation would nonetheless be fatal because it 
would support express preemption.267  According to the court, a 
failure-to-warn claim premised on a manufacturer’s duty to warn the 
patient or the patient’s physician would be expressly preempted 
because such a duty is not “genuinely equivalent” to any FDA 
requirement.268  FDA regulations do not require manufacturers to 
warn individual doctors about the safety and effectiveness of a 
device.269  Thus, plaintiff’s claim “would hold [the defendant] liable 
under state law without having violated an equivalent federal law” 
and therefore would be expressly preempted, even if not impliedly 
preempted.270 
Another context in which district courts have expanded Buckman 
involves claims based on an off-label promotion theory.  In Riley v. 
Cordis Corp., the District Court of Minnesota concluded that 
plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim was impliedly preempted to the 
extent that it was based on an off-label promotion theory.271  In Riley, 
Cordis manufactured a Cypher stent, a drug-coated stent that is 
implanted in a coronary artery to open up the artery and improve 
blood flow.272  The plaintiff suffered a blood clot when the Cypher 
stent was implanted through direct stenting.273  Direct stenting occurs 
when the stent is implanted in an artery that has not previously been 
predilated with a balloon catheter.274  Since the FDA did not approve 
direct stenting of the Cypher stent, it constituted an off-label use.275  
Plaintiff alleged that Cordis promoted the off-label use in a manner 
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that was not authorized by the FDCA.276  The court held the claim to 
be “impliedly preempted” under Buckman, because “promoting the 
off-label use of an FDA-approved medical device is not unlawful 
under ‘traditional state tort law which had predated the federal 
enactments in question[].’’277 
However, the Riley court did recognize that the plaintiff could 
have avoided implied preemption if Cordis (1) promoted the off-label 
use in a manner unauthorized by the FDCA, and (2) failed to include 
adequate warnings about the off-label use it was promoting.278  The 
first allegation would protect the claim from express preemption since 
it is premised on a violation of the FDCA.279  The second allegation 
would protect the claim from implied preemption because a duty to 
warn physicians or patients when an injury is reasonably foreseeable 
rests on traditional state law.280 
Although the court granted leave to amend, it would be quite 
difficult for the plaintiff in Riley to prevail on this narrow theory.281  
The plaintiff’s claim would be expressly preempted if it solely alleged 
that manufacturer’s off-label promotion triggered a duty to warn 
about the off-label use.  As the court explained, under the FDCA a 
“manufacturer could disseminate information about an off-label use 
of a device without triggering the duty to provide instructions or 
warnings about that off-label use.”282  Therefore, the only way for 
plaintiff to prevail on this theory would be if the manufacturer 
changed the label while promoting off-label use.283  However, since 
there are strict limitations on a manufacturer’s ability to change its 
label post-approval, it likely will be difficult for plaintiff to amend the 
complaint and survive preemption.284 
In Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., the court also held plaintiff’s off-
label promotion theory to be impliedly preempted.285  In Caplinger, 
the plaintiff suffered an injury after Medtronic’s Infuse device was 
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used for posterior-approach lumbar spine fusion surgery to correct a 
degenerative disc condition.286  The use of Infuse during posterior 
fusion surgery was off-label because the FDA approved Infuse for 
anterior but not posterior surgery.  The plaintiff brought a fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim and a negligence claim based on the theory 
that Medtronic promoted the off-label use of Infuse in posterior 
fusion surgery while downplaying its risks.287  The court held that both 
of these claims were impliedly preempted because promotion of off-
label use is governed by the FDCA.288  The court concluded that 
“‘off-label use’ is a creature of the FDCA” and “is not a part of 
Oklahoma substantive law . . . . While plaintiff couches her claim as a 
state law negligence claim, this claim is, in substance, a claim for 
violating the FDCA and, thus, is clearly preempted under Buckman 
and § 337(a).”289 
While these courts have interpreted Buckman broadly, other courts 
have limited Buckman to only fraud-on-the-FDA claims.290  The Fifth 
Circuit in Hughes held that the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim was 
not impliedly preempted.291  As mentioned previously, Hughes 
involved Boston Scientific’s alleged failure to report serious burns 
associated with its uterine device in violation of the MDR 
requirement to report “serious injuries” and “malfunctions.”292  The 
court held that the plaintiff’s claim is not analogous to Buckman, 
where “plaintiff did not assert a violation of a state tort duty,” 
because here, “Hughes is asserting a Mississippi tort claim based on 
the underlying state duty to warn about the dangers or risks of 
product . . . . [H]er claim is comparable to the tort claims in Silkwood 
and Lohr that Buckman recognized as surviving implied 
preemption.”293 
The Seventh Circuit in Bausch v. Stryker Corp. reached a similar 
result as the Fifth Circuit.  In Bausch, the Seventh Circuit held that 
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plaintiff’s manufacturing defect claim, alleging that Stryker’s hip 
implant system was adulterated in violation of the CGMPs, was not 
impliedly preempted.294  The Seventh Circuit rejected Stryker’s 
argument that there is “no state tort duty to manufacture a product 
that is not adulterated.”295  The court stated that “[w]hile there may 
not be a ‘traditional state law’ claim for an ‘adulterated’ 
product . . . the federal definition of adulterated medical devices is 
tied directly to the duty of manufacturers to avoid foreseeable 
dangers.”296  This stands in direct contrast to Lewkut, where the court 
held that virtually the same claim was impliedly preempted.297 
Like the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit in Stengel 
has refused to extend Buckman to impliedly preempt traditional state 
law tort claims.298  After a catheter manufactured by Medtronic was 
implanted into Richard Stengel’s abdomen, a granuloma formed at 
the catheter tip, rendering Stengel permanently paraplegic in 2005.299  
The Stengels alleged that if Medtronic warned physicians that the 
catheter could cause a granuloma prior to Stengel’s injury, Stengel’s 
symptoms would have been diagnosed sooner, which in turn would 
have prevented his paralysis.300 
The Stengels’ failure-to-warn claim was premised on the theory 
that Medtronic breached its post-sale duty to report adverse events to 
the FDA.301  The Stengels allege that Medtronic knew that a 
granuloma could form at the catheter tip prior to Stengel’s injury, but 
failed to report that information to the FDA.302  Particularly, 
according to the Stengels, FDA inspections in 2006 and 2007 revealed 
that Medtronic knew about the risks of a granuloma forming at the 
catheter tip.303  After the inspection, the FDA sent a warning letter to 
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Medtronic stating that Medtronic “misbranded” its device in violation 
of FDCA regulations.304 
Before the en banc rehearing, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
Stengels’ failure-to-warn claim was impliedly preempted by 
Buckman.305  However, en banc, the full court reversed.306  The Ninth 
Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ failure to warn the FDA claim rested 
on traditional state law because “Arizona law contemplates a warning 
to a third party such as the FDA.”307  Under Arizona law, a 
manufacturer’s duty to a third party is satisfied if “there is ‘reasonable 
assurance that the information will reach those whose safety depends 
on their having it.’”308  In his concurrence, Judge Watford echoed the 
majority but put more of an emphasis on public policy objectives.309  
Watford argued that “there is no question that state law has an 
important and legitimate role to play in regulating the adequacy of 
post-sale warnings for products already on the market.”310 
The California Court of Appeals affirmed Stengel in a recent case 
even though Stengel was not binding on the court.311  In Coleman v. 
Medtronic, Inc., Medtronic allegedly failed to report adverse events 
associated with the off-label use of Infuse in posterior fusion 
surgery.312  Medtronic argued that plaintiff’s claim should be 
impliedly preempted because there is no duty to warn the FDA under 
state law, only a duty to warn physicians who then warn patients.313  
The court rejected Medtronic’s argument because a duty to warn the 
FDA is contemplated by California’s duty to “warn of a particular 
risk that was known or knowable in light of the generally recognized 
and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the 
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time of manufacture and distribution.”314  The court further reasoned 
the “duty to warn should not be so narrowly defined as to exclude a 
requirement to file adverse event reports with the FDA if that is the 
only available method to warn doctors and consumers.”315  Hence, the 
court concluded that plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim premised on 
violations of the MDR is not impliedly preempted. 
The court similarly held that the plaintiff’s negligence per se claim, 
premised on Medtronic’s failure to report adverse events, was not 
impliedly preempted.316  The court held that in actions involving 
negligence per se, the federal requirement is only used to establish 
the standard of care; the state law claim as a whole still very much 
relies on traditional state law.317  The court stated “Coleman uses the 
negligence per se doctrine, well recognized in California tort law, to 
ensure that the state law duty he alleges directly parallels federal law; 
however, he is pursuing a remedy under state law, not federal law.”318 
Lastly, the Coleman court held that plaintiff’s alternative 
negligence per se theory, that Medtronic promoted the off-label use 
of posterior surgery in a manner unauthorized by the FDCA, was also 
not impliedly preempted.319  The court held that plaintiff’s off-label 
promotion theory “is rooted in traditional state tort law and exists 
regardless of the FDCA and its regulations because the manufacturer 
of a medical device owes a duty of reasonable care to the consumer of 
such a device even in the absence of FDA regulations.”320 
III.  ARGUMENTS IN STENGEL V. MEDTRONIC, INC. 
After the Ninth Circuit in Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc. ruled that 
plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claim was not preempted either expressly or 
impliedly, Medtronic filed a petition for certiorari.321  In its petition, 
Medtronic made two arguments as to why the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
should be reversed.  First, it argued that the Stengels’ failure-to-warn 
claim should be expressly preempted because they have not alleged a 
federal requirement specific to the device in question.322  Second, it 
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asserted that the Stengels’ failure-to-warn claim should be impliedly 
preempted because it is not independent of the MDA 
requirements.323  In its brief in opposition, the Stengels argued that a 
state law claim premised on a generally applicable requirement such 
as the MDR should survive both express and implied preemption.324  
The United States filed an amicus curiae brief that is generally in 
accord with the Stengels’ position.325 
Although the Supreme Court ultimately denied Medtronic’s 
petition for certiorari,326 the arguments expressed in the Stengel briefs 
are well-crafted and will likely be used by plaintiffs and defendants in 
future cases.  This is especially true now that the Supreme Court has 
allowed the circuit split on the contours of the parallel claim 
exception to continue.  Further, this Note argues that the Supreme 
Court should bridge the divide amongst the circuits in a subsequent 
case, and predicts that the arguments that the Supreme Court will be 
presented with will be similar to the arguments made in Stengel. 
A. The General/Device-Specific Argument in Stengel 
1. The Argument for a Circuit Split 
The Stengels’ failure-to-warn claim relies on a violation of a 
generally applicable or industry-wide violation of the FDA’s MDRs.  
Specifically, the claim relies on 21 U.S.C. § 360i(a) and 21 C.F.R. § 
803.50(a), which require a manufacturer to report information that 
reasonably suggests that the device “may have caused or contributed 
to a death or serious injury.”327  In its petition for certiorari, 
Medtronic argues that there is a circuit split on whether such a 
generally applicable requirement like the MDR survives express 
preemption.328  According to Medtronic, the Eighth and Eleventh 
Circuits have held that only claims premised on a violation of a 
device-specific requirement survive preemption.329  By contrast, the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have allowed generally applicable 
requirements to survive preemption.330 
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2. The Argument Against a Circuit Split 
The Stengels denied the existence of a circuit split.  The Stengels 
argued that the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that a 
violation of a generally applicable requirement survives express 
preemption.  However, according to the Stengels, the Eighth and 
Eleventh Circuits are consistent with the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh 
Circuit opinions.  The Stengels contended that in the Eighth and 
Eleventh Circuit opinions, Sprint Fidelis and Wolicki-Gables, the 
plaintiffs “failed to tie their particular claims to the violation of any 
[particular] federal requirement, either general or device-specific.”331  
Therefore, no circuit court opinion stands for the proposition that 
plaintiff must plead a device-specific federal requirement.332 
The United States as amicus curiae agreed with the Stengels’ 
proposition that the circuits do not diverge on whether a requirement 
be general or device-specific.333  The United States contended that 
“[m]ost courts . . . have held that a state requirement is saved from 
express preemption if it parallels a federal requirement of any kind, 
be it device-specific or general.”334  According to the United States, 
although some courts have preempted claims premised on a generally 
applicable requirement, “the cases provide no explanation as to why 
that would be so, and they appear ultimately to rest on deficiencies in 
the plaintiff’s pleadings.”335 
3. The Argument for the General/Specific Distinction 
After Medtronic made the argument for a circuit split, it urged that 
a claim premised on a generally applicable federal requirement is 
expressly preempted because the federal requirement must be 
specific to the device in question.336  Medtronic relied on Lohr in 
support of its proposition—“this Court held in Lohr that generalized 
federal duties that apply to all medical devices are not federal 
‘requirements’ within the meaning of § 360k(a).”337  According to 
Medtronic, the MDR is too generalized to be a federal requirement 
under § 360k because it applies to all medical devices.338  To fall 
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within the parallel claim exception, the violation of a federal 
requirement must run parallel to a violation of state law duty.339  
Hence, under Medtronic’s logic, plaintiff’s state law claim premised 
on a generalized violation of a federal duty cannot fit within the 
parallel claim exception because a generalized federal duty is not a 
requirement under § 360k(a).340 
Medtronic further claimed that the Ninth Circuit’s decision to 
allow generally applicable requirements to escape preemption would 
“open the floodgates to potentially massive state-law liability imposed 
by lay juries asked to second-guess the FDA’s expert regulatory 
oversight.”341  Medtronic seemed to take the position that a state law 
claim based on such a vague violation of the FDA regulations would 
afford the jury the discretion to second-guess the decisions of the 
FDA and thus impose state requirements “different from or in 
addition to” those imposed by the FDA.342 
4. The Argument Against a General/Specific Distinction 
The Stengels took the contrary position that “nothing in § 360k(a), 
Lohr, or Riegel demands that the requirement be specific to a 
particular device.”343  According to the Stengels, the Supreme Court 
in Lohr “held, unanimously, that the Lohr’s labeling claims were not 
preempted . . . although the device was subject to no device-specific 
requirements at all.”344  The Stengels also argued that in Bates, the 
Supreme Court held that plaintiff’s claim survived preemption 
although there was no product-specific labeling requirement.345 
The United States agreed with the conclusion reached by the 
Stengels and the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, but for 
different reasons.  According to the United States, the Court need not 
analyze whether a generally applicable requirement fits within the 
parallel claim exception because a generally applicable requirement 
has no preemptive effect to begin with.346  This is in contrast to the 
Stengels and the circuit courts, who assumed that all federal 
requirements, general or specific, have preemptive effect and thus 
must fit within the parallel claim exception to avoid express 
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preemption.  The United States relied on Lohr, FDA regulations, and 
public policy objectives for its proposition that a generally applicable 
requirement has no preemptive effect whatsoever.347 
B. The Implied Preemption Argument in Stengel 
1. The Argument for a Circuit Split 
As it does with express preemption, Medtronic argued that the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Stengel deepens a split amongst the circuits 
as to whether the MDA impliedly preempts state law claims based on 
a manufacturer’s failure to report adverse events to the FDA.348  
While the Sixth Circuit in Cupek and the Eighth Circuit in Sprint 
Fidelis have impliedly preempted such claims, the Fifth Circuit in 
Hughes and the Ninth Circuit in Stengel have reached the opposite 
conclusion.349 
2. The Argument Against a Circuit Split 
The Stengels, on the other hand, denied the existence of a circuit 
split on whether state law failure-to-warn-the-FDA claims are 
impliedly preempted.350  They argued that “the cases cited by 
Medtronic do not reflect different approaches to preemption but 
rather different outcomes based on different pleadings.”351  The 
Stengels contended that Cupek and Sprint Fidelis are consistent with 
the decisions of the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.352  In Cupek 
and Sprint Fidelis, the plaintiff only alleged that the manufacturer 
breached a duty to the government, whereas in Hughes and Stengel 
the plaintiffs alleged that the manufacturer breached a duty to the 
plaintiff.353  In Cupek and Sprint Fidelis, the courts impliedly 
preempted plaintiffs’ state law claims because they were disguised 
fraud on the FDA claims that were dependent upon the FDCA.  
They were dependent upon the FDCA because they would not have 
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been cognizable without an FDA violation.354  In contrast, the claims 
in Stengel and Hughes were not impliedly preempted because 
plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer violated a duty owed to the 
plaintiff.355  A claim premised on a duty owed to the plaintiff rests on 
traditional state law.356  The United States, as amicus curiae, also 
takes the Stengels’ position that there is no circuit split as to whether 
state law tort claims are impliedly preempted.357 
3. The Argument for Implied Preemption 
Medtronic urged the Supreme Court to take the position of the 
Sixth and Eighth Circuits because they have interpreted Buckman 
“correctly,” while the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have not.358  Medtronic 
read Buckman as holding that “the state law duty on which the claim 
is based must be independent of any duty imposed by the MDA.”359  
Medtronic explained that the Stengels’ state law claim is not 
independent of any federal duty because there is no duty for 
manufacturers to submit information to the FDA under Arizona 
law.360  According to Medtronic, Arizona law only imposes a general 
duty to warn physicians and consumers; it does not impose a duty to 
warn the federal government.361  Further, a state law duty requiring 
manufacturers to submit information to the federal government 
would “defy settled principles of federalism and sovereignty.”362  
Therefore, since plaintiffs’ state law claim is not independent of the 
federal duty alleged, their claim should be impliedly preempted as in 
Buckman.363 
In addition, Medtronic argued that the Stengels’ failure-to-warn 
claim should be impliedly preempted for public policy reasons 
because, as in Buckman, a failure-to-warn claim directly interferes 
with the regulatory scheme of the FDA.364  First, a state law violation 
would interfere with the FDA’s authority to determine whether to 
withdraw approval when the manufacturer has failed to report 
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adverse events.365  Second, complying with state law would increase 
the burdens on manufacturers and discourage them from seeking 
approval, or induce them to submit a deluge of adverse event reports 
that the FDA neither wants nor needs.366  Third, the causation inquiry 
under state tort law would burden the FDA.367  Medtronic claimed 
that causation can only be proven by establishing how the FDA 
would have responded if Medtronic submitted adverse event 
reports.368  Such an inquiry would “ensnare agency personnel in 
burdensome discovery and divert the agency from its regulatory 
mission.”369  Further, the causation inquiry would require a lay jury to 
determine what the FDA should have done if it had this information, 
which “would authorize lay juries to superintend the FDA’s decision-
making.”370 
4. The Argument Against Implied Preemption 
The Stengels, on the other hand, argued that their claim that 
Medtronic breached its duty to report adverse events to the FDA is 
based on “an independent state law duty, not a duty that exists only 
under federal law.”371  They relied on the third-party duty-to-warn 
doctrine to establish a state law duty that is independent of the 
FDCA.  The Stengels argued that under Arizona law “a warning to a 
third party satisfies a manufacturer’s duty if, given the warning and 
relationship of the third party, there is a reasonable assurance that the 
information will reach those whose safety depends on their having 
it.”372  In other words, Medtronic had a state law duty to warn the 
FDA, which in turn should have warned physicians, who in turn 
should have warned patients.  The Stengels argued that Medtronic’s 
ultimate duty was to the plaintiff, and thus Medtronic breached that 
duty by failing to warn the FDA.373  According to the Stengels, then, 
their claim is different than Buckman’s claim, in which the 
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manufacturer only owed a duty to the FDA because here, 
Medtronic’s ultimate duty was to the plaintiff.374 
The Stengels also rejected Medtronic’s argument that the state law 
claim would lead to second-guessing of FDA decision-making.375  
They claimed that this case was unlike Buckman, where the jury 
would have to speculate on whether the FDA would have approved 
the drug in the absence of fraud, because “the FDA has already 
decided [through its warning letter] that Medtronic had not 
adequately complied with federal reporting requirements.”376  In its 
reply brief, Medtronic made two points in response to the argument 
that the FDA already determined Medtronic failed to comply with 
the FDA.  First, the warning letter does not constitute a final agency 
action and thus does not represent a decision by the FDA that 
Medtronic violated MDA requirements.377  Second, even if the FDA 
made a final determination that Medtronic violated the MDA, the 
state law claim would still invite a lay jury to “second-guess the 
FDA’s carefully calibrated choice of remedy.”378 
The United States made a different argument as to why the 
Stengels’ claim should not be impliedly preempted.379  In fact, the 
United States believed that the Stengels’ reliance on the third-party 
duty-to-warn doctrine created a causation hurdle that may implicate 
Buckman.380  There is a causation hurdle under the third-party duty-
to-warn theory because plaintiff must show that the manufacturer 
“should have reported adverse events to the FDA, which in turn 
would have warned physicians.”381  The United States believed that 
the “causation hurdle refers to the agency decision-making process 
and therefore may implicate Buckman.”382  However, according to 
the United States, the Stengels had a more natural theory of 
causation that did not implicate Buckman.383  This theory alleged that, 
upon learning of the adverse events associated with its catheter, 
Medtronic should have strengthened the warning of its device.384  The 
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CBE regulation allows a manufacturer to revise a device’s labeling, 
without prior FDA approval.385  According to the United States, this 
CBE theory relies on traditional state law and thus avoids Buckman 
because it does not depend upon the FDA to warn doctors, but rather 
requires the manufacturer to warn doctors directly by revising its 
label. 
In fact, the United States contended that a claim premised on the 
CBE process “would mirror the failure to warn claim against the 
prescription drug manufacturer that this Court held was not impliedly 
preempted in Wyeth.”386  In Wyeth v. Levine, plaintiff alleged that 
Wyeth failed to warn about the dangers of the “IV push method” in 
injecting the drug Phenergan.387  Wyeth argued that Levine’s claim 
should be subject to implied conflict preemption/impossibility 
preemption because it is impossible for Wyeth to comply with state 
law requiring Wyeth to strengthen its warning and federal law, which 
prevents a manufacturer from changing its warning without FDA 
approval.388  The Supreme Court rejected Wyeth’s argument because 
the CBE regulation allows a manufacturer to unilaterally strengthen 
its warning.389  Therefore, the Supreme Court found it is possible for 
manufacturers to comply with both state and federal law.390  Wyeth 
also made an obstacle preemption argument similar to that of 
Buckman, that strengthening its warning would “obstruct the 
purposes and objectives of federal drug labeling.”391  The Supreme 
Court was also not persuaded by this argument.392  The United States, 
as amicus curiae in Stengel, argued that, like in Wyeth, the Stengels’ 
                                                                                                                 
 385. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2014); Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae, supra note 4, at 2. 
 386. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 4, at 20. 
 387. Phernagen can be injected through the “IV push method,” whereby the drug 
is directly injected into the patient’s vein or through the “IV drip method,” whereby 
the drug is introduced into a saline solution and slowly descends into the vein 
through a catheter.  The “IV push method” poses a greater risk than the “IV drip 
method.”  Plaintiff argued that the manufacturer should have instructed to use the 
“IV drip method” instead of the “IV push method.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 
560 (2009). 
 388. Id. at 570. 
 389. “The CBE regulation permitted Wyeth to unilaterally strengthen its warning, 
and the mere fact that the FDA approved Phenergan’s label does not establish that it 
would have prohibited such a change.” Id. at 573. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. “Wyeth has not persuaded us that failure-to-warn claims like Levine’s 
obstruct the federal regulation of drug labeling.” Id. at 581. 
2014] PARALLEL CLAIM EXCEPTION 337 
claim should not be preempted, because the CBE regulation also 
applies to medical devices.393 
IV.  WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED 
STENGELS’ CLAIM TO SURVIVE EXPRESS AND IMPLIED 
PREEMPTION 
The Supreme Court was faced with an array of complex arguments 
on both the respondent and petitioner’s side.  This Note argues that 
the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Stengel v. 
Medtronic to clarify the confusion surrounding exactly which claims 
survive express and implied preemption.  In the future, the circuit 
courts and the Supreme Court should adopt a liberal approach in 
allowing plaintiffs to plead violations of generally applicable 
requirements, but a conservative approach in applying Buckman to 
impliedly preempt state law tort claims. 
A. Violations of Generally Applicable Federal Requirements 
Should Survive Preemption 
1. There Is a Circuit Split on Whether a Federal Requirement must 
Be Generally Applicable or Device-Specific 
The Supreme Court should have granted Medtronic’s petition for 
certiorari because there is indeed a circuit split on whether the federal 
requirement must be device-specific or generally applicable.  
Although the Supreme Court skirted the issue by denying certiorari 
in Stengel, hopefully they will mend the circuit split in the near future.  
However, it must first be noted that the Stengels’ argument—that 
there is not a circuit split, but rather that the different outcomes in the 
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits reflect problems of pleading—has some 
merit.  In Sprint Fidelis and Wolicki-Gables, the two cases holding 
that a requirement be device-specific, the plaintiffs did not tie their 
injuries to any particular requirement, whether general or specific.  In 
Wolicki-Gables, the plaintiffs did not cite a particular federal 
requirement that was violated; instead, they merely alleged that the 
manufacturer failed to reasonably design, manufacture, and provide 
adequate warnings of its pump system.394 
The same can be said about Sprint Fidelis, to an extent.  In Sprint 
Fidelis, the Eighth Circuit found plaintiff’s manufacturing defect 
claim to allege that “state law entitles every person who has an 
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implanted Sprint Fidelis lead[] to damages . . . because all Sprint 
Fidelis leads have an unreasonably high risk of fracture failure.”395  
Therefore, the problem with this claim is that, although pleaded as a 
parallel manufacturing defect claim, in actuality it amounts to a 
design defect claim.396  Design defect claims are almost always 
expressly preempted under Riegel.397  It is plausible that the court’s 
perception of the plaintiff’s claim as a design defect claim was due to 
her reliance on the generally applicable CGMPs.  At the same time, it 
is also plausible that the court would not view plaintiff’s claim as a 
design defect claim if she were more concrete in tying her injury to 
the manufacturer’s violation of the CGMP. 
In comparison to Wolicki-Gables and Sprint Fidelis, the pleadings 
presented in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits may have been 
stronger.  As evidenced by Bass, Howard, and Hughes, the plaintiffs’ 
claims in these circuits may have survived preemption because the 
manufacturers’ violation of a generally applicable regulation was tied 
to plaintiff’s injury.  First, in Bass, the complaint alleged that Stryker 
violated 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.20(a), 820.20(b)(2), and 820.70(e), which 
caused Bass to suffer from a loose Shell due to lack of bony 
ingrowth.398  Second, in Howard, the complaint alleged that Sulzer 
violated 21 C.F.R. § 820.70(h) by leaving oil on its machine, which 
thereby caused plaintiff’s knee implant to fail.399  Third, in Hughes, 
the complaint alleged that if Boston Scientific had complied with 21 
C.F.R. § 803.50(a) and reported second-degree burns, the FDA would 
have taken action, thereby preventing plaintiff from suffering from 
such a burn.400 
Although the pleadings in Sprint Fidelis and Wolicki-Gables may 
have been weaker than their counterparts, there are a number of 
district court pleadings that failed to survive preemption despite being 
as concrete as those in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.  For 
example, in Ilarraza, the Eastern District of New York dismissed 
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plaintiff’s claims even though the plaintiff referenced particular 
CGMP violations.401  Further, in Parker v. Stryker, the progeny of 
Sprint Fidelis, the District Court of Colorado dismissed plaintiff’s 
parallel claims against Stryker’s Trident hip implant system, even 
though plaintiff referenced particular CGMP violations and warning 
letters issued by the FDA which found Stryker violated the MDR and 
CGMPs.402  The Parker decision is in conflict with that of Seventh 
Circuit in Bausch where plaintiff referenced the same CGMP 
violations and warning letters regarding the Trident System and yet 
survived dismissal.403 
The Supreme Court also should have more closely considered the 
language in Sprint Fidelis and Wolicki-Gables, which clearly states 
that the plaintiff must allege a violation of a specific requirement in 
the device’s PMA.  In Wolicki-Gables, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
a plaintiff must point to “specific PMA requirements in the PMA 
approval.”404  In Sprint Fidelis, the Eighth Circuit stated that 
“[p]laintiffs simply failed to adequately plead that Medtronic violated 
a federal requirement specific to the FDA’s PMA approval.”405  
Further, although some courts have distinguished the different 
outcomes amongst the Circuits, others have more candidly recognized 
the divide.406  For these reasons, the divide amongst the lower courts 
is real, and the Supreme Court ought to bridge the divide.  In bridging 
the divide, the Supreme Court should hold that a violation of a 
generally applicable requirement survives express preemption. 
2. Generally Applicable Requirements Should Escape Preemption 
Public policy and precedent dictate that violations of a generally 
applicable requirement escape preemption.  There are two alternative 
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holdings by the Supreme Court that would reach this end goal: (1) 
violations of generally applicable requirements have no preemptive 
effect whatsoever, or (2) violations of generally applicable 
requirements fall within the parallel claim exception.  Admittedly, 
these are two divergent approaches that reach the same result of 
allowing Stengels’ claims to avoid preemption.  Fitting generally 
applicable requirements within the parallel claim exception is clearly 
the better of the two approaches.  Affording generalized 
requirements no preemptive effect would reduce the parallel claim 
exception to a nullity.407  It would also reach the perverse result of 
making it easier for claims premised on a generally applicable 
requirement to avoid preemption than it would be for a device-
specific requirement.408  Nonetheless, either approach is acceptable 
because it allows state law claims premised on the generally 
applicable MDRs or CGMPs to escape preemption.  Allowing these 
generalized requirements to avoid preemption is not only consistent 
with Lohr and § 360k, but it is also necessary given the practical 
difficulties of alleging a device-specific requirement at the pleading 
stage. 
a. Why Violations of Generally Applicable Requirements Should 
Have no Preemptive Effect 
The United States’ argument that generally applicable 
requirements have no preemptive effect because they are not federal 
requirements under § 360(k) does have support in Lohr.  The Lohr 
court stated that “in most cases a state law will be pre-empted only to 
the extent that the FDA has promulgated a relevant federal 
‘requirement.’”409  It would seem that “relevant” most likely means 
device-specific.410  In addition, 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) provides that 
“[s]tate or local requirements are preempted only when [the FDA] 
has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other 
specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the 
[FDCA].”411  For these reasons, it is plausible that a regulation has to 
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be device-specific to have preemptive effect pursuant to Lohr and 
FDCA regulations. 
Further, it can be argued that there would be minimal interference 
with the FDA decision-making process if a generally applicable 
requirement had no preemptive effect.412  Only a device-specific 
requirement in the PMA reflects the FDA’s weighing of the risks and 
benefits of the device in question.413  However, as explained in more 
detail below, a compelling argument can be made that a generally 
applicable requirement interferes with FDA regulatory objectives.414  
This is because the open-ended nature of a generally applicable 
requirement provides a jury greater discretion in interpreting the 
FDA’s regulations. 
b. Why Generally Applicable Requirements Should Fall Within the 
Parallel Claim Exception 
Assuming arguendo that the Supreme Court rules that a generally 
applicable requirement has preemptive effect, preemption can still be 
avoided if the requirements fall within the parallel claim exception.  
However, Medtronic argues that only violations of a device-specific 
federal requirement fall within the parallel claim exception, whereas 
generally applicable requirements do not run parallel, and thus are 
expressly preempted.415  Medtronic’s distinction between specific and 
generally applicable requirements is misplaced. 
Although Lohr, as mentioned above, suggests that there is a 
distinction between specific and general requirements, there is 
nothing in the text of § 360k to suggest a distinction.416  Section 360k 
preempts a claim that imposes on a manufacturer “any 
requirement . . . which is different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device.”417  Because 
§ 360k uses the broad phrase “any requirement,” generally applicable 
requirements should fall within its purview.418  Further, there is 
nothing to suggest that generally applicable requirements are any less 
of a requirement than device-specific ones.  First, the generally 
applicable CGMPs, QSRs, and MDRs refer to themselves as 
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requirements.419  Second, generally applicable requirements are as 
legally binding as device-specific requirements.420  For instance, 
failure to comply with the QSRs, CGMPs, and MDRs can result in 
regulatory action.421  Third, the differences between the two 
requirements are not intransigent, as generally applicable 
requirements can become device-specific requirements.  As the Sixth 
Circuit noted in Howard, the CGMP standards can be incorporated 
into the PMA, which would transform them from industry-wide 
standards to device-specific requirements.422  For these reasons, if 
device-specific regulations constitute requirements, then so should 
generally applicable ones.  Therefore, if the Court fails to find that a 
generally applicable requirement has preemptive effect, it should at 
the very least find that a generally applicable requirement avoids 
preemption because it falls within the parallel claim exception. 
Medtronic twisted Lohr into holding that a state law claim 
premised on a violation of a generally applicable requirement does 
not fall within the parallel claim exception.423  The Lohr court stated 
that the CGMPs “reflect important but entirely generic concerns 
about device regulation generally” and that a requirement must be 
“‘applicable to the device’ in question.”424  Medtronic argues that 
under Lohr, generally applicable regulations do not constitute 
requirements and thus cannot parallel state law.425  However, 
Medtronic’s argument should be rejected.  If a generally applicable 
regulation is not a requirement under § 360k, it would be more 
consistent with Lohr if that requirement had no preemptive effect.426  
                                                                                                                 
 419. 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1; 803.50(a) (2014). 
 420. “[F]ederal law is clear: for manufacturers of Class III medical devices, the 
Quality System Regulations and Current Good Manufacturing Practices adopted by 
the FDA under its delegated regulatory authority are legally binding requirements 
‘under this chapter.’” Bausch, 630 F.3d at 555 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 820.1). 
 421. 21 C.F.R. § 820.1(c) (providing that “the failure to comply with any applicable 
provision in this part [of the regulations] renders a device adulterated under section 
501(h) of the act.  Such a device, as well as any person responsible for the failure to 
comply, is subject to regulatory action.”); see also CCH Drug & Cosmetics L. Rep. ¶ 
350,140 (Apr. 1, 1996), available at 1996 WL 34474338 (“Failure to comply with the 
MDR requirements is a prohibited act under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FD&C Act).  Commission of a prohibited act may subject user facilities to injunction 
proceedings under Section 302 and criminal penalties under Section 303 of the FD&C 
Act.”). 
 422. Howard v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 382 F. App’x 436, 439 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 423. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 31. 
 424. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 501 (1996); see also Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 31. 
 425. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 31. 
 426. See supra notes 409–11 and accompanying text. 
2014] PARALLEL CLAIM EXCEPTION 343 
Medtronic’s proposition would lead to the absurd result of treating 
generally applicable regulations as requirements to give them 
preemptive effect, but then treat them as if they were not 
requirements to avoid a parallel claim analysis.  Such a result would 
further complicate an already very complicated preemption doctrine. 
Medtronic’s policy argument, that allowing claims premised on 
generally applicable requirements can lead to jury second-guessing of 
FDA decisions, has some merit, but that concern is ultimately 
overblown.  Admittedly, compared to the extensive and detailed 
procedures specified in the PMA, the CGMPs and MDRs are vague 
and open-ended in order to give the manufacturer flexibility to 
implement best practices.427  However, the fear of jury second-
guessing is likely overstated for several reasons.  First, as the Court 
explained in Bausch, the meaning of FDA regulations is a matter of 
law for the judge, not the jury, to decide.428  Since judicial 
interpretation of FDA regulations is subject to the federal appeals 
process, the interpretation of FDA regulations should be relatively 
uniform.429  Second, a jury likely will be presented with a narrow 
question, such as whether the manufacturer submitted reports to the 
FDA when the device contributed to death or serious injury.  This is a 
common sense question that would not superintend the FDA’s 
scientific expertise.  A jury would not have to conjure what is a 
serious injury because a “serious injury” is defined in the MDR.430  
Third, as in Hughes and Stengel, presenting the jury with the FDA 
warning letters, which have already determined the manufacturer 
failed to comply with the MDR, will ensure that the jury does not find 
a violation beyond what the FDA found.431 
Putting precedent aside, a generally applicable requirement should 
also avoid express preemption due to the difficulty in alleging a 
device-specific requirement.  Plaintiffs may not have the opportunity 
for discovery during the pleading stage.432  As both the majority in 
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Bausch and the dissent in Sprint Fidelis note, it is virtually impossible 
for a plaintiff to plead a device-specific violation without discovery.433  
To plead a device-specific violation, a plaintiff would need access to 
information contained within the PMA, but this information is 
generally proprietary and not obtainable without discovery.434  In the 
failure-to-warn context, alleging a device-specific violation would 
likely require access to mandatory adverse event reports or voluntary 
adverse event reports.435  Mandatory adverse event reports, which 
annually document the serious injuries or deaths associated with the 
manufacturer’s device, may not even be discoverable at all.436  
Although the consensus is that voluntary adverse event reports are 
discoverable, it is practically impossible for the plaintiff to access both 
types of adverse event reports without discovery.437 
There are creative ways in which plaintiffs’ attorneys can try to 
allege a device-specific requirement without discovery.  Methods 
include Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests to obtain portions 
of the FDA’s PMA files, post-market surveillance studies, and 
Establishment Inspection Reports (EIRs).438  Plaintiffs’ lawyers can 
also obtain FDA advisory committee reports, public filings issued by 
the manufacturer, and information on suspected deaths, injuries, and 
malfunctions from the Manufacturer and User Facility Device 
Experience (MAUDE) database.439  Although these approaches are a 
cause for some optimism among plaintiff attorneys, obtaining PMA 
documents in discovery is still far more likely to yield information 
that the manufacturer violated a device-specific requirement.440 
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For the aforementioned reasons, state law tort claims based on 
generally applicable federal requirements should not be expressly 
preempted.  Generally applicable requirements should either have no 
preemptive effect at all, or at least fall into the parallel claim 
exception.  Although either conclusion would be acceptable, fitting 
generally applicable requirements within the parallel claim exceptions 
makes more sense.  First, holding that generalized requirements have 
no preemptive effect would reduce the parallel claim exception, that 
the Court spent time to carve out in Lohr and Riegel, and then tried 
to preserve in Bartlett, to a nullity.441  This is because if generalized 
requirements had no preemptive effect, plaintiffs would sensibly try 
to avoid preemption entirely by pleading a violation of a generalized 
requirement rather than trying to fit their claims within the parallel 
claim exception. 
Additionally, if a generalized requirement had no preemptive 
effect, it may be easier for plaintiff to avoid preemption by pleading a 
violation of a generalized requirement than it would be for plaintiff to 
plead a device-specific violation.  A claim premised on a violation of a 
device-specific requirement would have to fit within the parallel claim 
exception, and thus undergo a genuine equivalency and implied 
preemption analysis.442  However, if given no preemptive effect, a 
generally applicable requirement would evade the parallel claim 
analysis in its entirety.  A more rigorous preemption analysis for 
violations of device-specific requirements, as opposed to generalized 
ones, is strange.  A state law claim premised on a violation of a 
device-specific requirement may be less likely to impose different or 
additional requirements under § 360k.  The FDA “weighed the 
competing interests relevant to the particular requirement in 
question” when it reviewed the device’s PMA application.443 
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Therefore a jury award based on a manufacturer’s failure to comply 
with device-specific PMA requirements probably would be less likely 
to diverge from the FDA’s intentions than a violation of a generalized 
requirement. 
Further, such a rule could encourage plaintiff’s lawyers to rely on 
industry-wide standards like the CGMP or MDR in their pleadings, 
instead of trying to get their hands on more concrete, device-specific 
information.  While a holding that generally applicable requirements 
have no preemptive effect gives greater leeway to generalized 
requirements than device-specific ones, recognizing the parallel claim 
exception properly treats both types of requirements with parity.  For 
these reasons, the Supreme Court should conduct a parallel claim 
analysis and thus hold that a violation of the industry-wide MDR is 
not expressly preempted. 
B. Traditional State Law Tort Claims Should Not Be Impliedly 
Preempted 
1. There Is a Circuit Split on Whether State Law Tort Claims Are 
Impliedly Preempted 
In its petition for certiorari in Stengel, Medtronic argued that the 
circuits are divided on whether state tort law claims are impliedly 
preempted under Buckman.  According to Medtronic, while the Sixth 
and Eighth Circuits have impliedly preempted state tort law claims, 
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have not.444  By contrast, the Stengels 
contended that the different outcomes can be explained by 
differences in pleading.445  They argued that, unlike Fifth and Ninth 
Circuit cases where the claims were premised on a state law duty 
owed to plaintiff, the claims in the Sixth and Eighth Circuit cases of 
Cupek and Sprint Fidelis were premised on a duty owed only to the 
FDA.446  There is a clear divide on the extent to which Buckman 
applies to state law tort claims.  The Supreme Court should have 
granted certiorari in order to bridge the divide. 
Despite the Stengels’ attempt to argue the contrary, the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuit decisions are irreconcilable with the Sixth 
and Eighth Circuit decisions, as well as with several district court 
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opinions.447  A brief comparison of these decisions reveals a clear 
divide.  In Sprint Fidelis, McClelland, and Wheeler, the courts have 
impliedly preempted state law failure-to-warn claims premised on the 
manufacturer’s failure to file adverse event reports.448  By contrast, in 
the Fifth and Ninth Circuit decisions of Stengel and Hughes, 
respectively, the courts held that state law failure-to-warn claims 
premised on the manufacturer’s failure to file adverse event were not 
impliedly preempted.449  In Lewkut, the district court held that a state 
law tort claim premised on adulteration of the device was impliedly 
preempted, whereas the Seventh Circuit in Bausch held the exact 
opposite.450  In Riley and Caplinger, the district courts impliedly 
preempted state law tort claims based on an off-label promotion 
theory, while the California Court of Appeals in Coleman did not.451 
The differences in state law cannot explain these different 
outcomes.  In all of the implied preemption cases, the state law tort 
duty that the plaintiffs sought to impose was virtually the same.452  
The Stengels argued that under Arizona law a manufacturer has as a 
duty to warn a third party when “there is ‘reasonable assurance that 
the information will reach those whose safety depends upon their 
having it.’” 453  However, the third-party duty to warn is not unique to 
Arizona.  The third-party duty principle was taken from a comment in 
the Second Restatement of Torts, and thus is a general proposition of 
tort law.454 
What explains the different outcomes is not differences in law or 
pleading, but rather divergent judicial interpretations about 
Buckman’s scope.  The Sixth and Eighth Circuits interpreted 
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Buckman to require that plaintiff’s claim (1) must be based on 
traditional state tort law, and (2) “would not exist if the FDCA did 
not exist.”455  According to Medtronic, though, the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits have eschewed the second prong; they have held that 
plaintiff’s claim passes Buckman’s test merely if it is based on 
traditional state law.456   However, the Ninth Circuit seems to be 
applying Buckman’s second prong.  In the view of these courts, the 
state law tort claims they were presented with would exist if not for 
the FDCA.457  Whether the Ninth Circuit is applying the additional 
element or not, it is clear that the Ninth Circuit’s, as well as the Fifth 
and Seventh Circuit’s interpretations of Buckman diverge from those 
of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits.  It could very well be that the 
different outcomes reflect different political attitudes towards 
preemption.458 
2. Traditional State Law Tort Claims Should Not Be Impliedly 
Preempted by Buckman 
The arguments that Medtronic and other manufacturers made as to 
why traditional state law tort claims should implicate Buckman are 
ultimately not compelling.  One main argument is that if fraudulently 
misrepresenting information to the FDA is impliedly preempted by 
Buckman, then failing to report information to the FDA should also 
fall within its ambit.  This is because both types of claims involve the 
failure to communicate properly with the FDA.459  Medtronic further 
argued that, like in Buckman, the plaintiff’s claim is dependent upon 
the FDA requirements because informing the FDA is a “critical 
element” of the plaintiff’s claim.460  According to Medtronic, Arizona 
common law does not impose a duty to warn the FDA, and thus the 
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manufacturer’s duty to warn the FDA would not exist if it were not 
for the FDA reporting requirements.461 
Medtronic’s argument that plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim 
premised on a third party duty to warn is dependent upon the FDCA 
has validity.  Under plaintiff’s third-party duty-to-warn theory, the 
manufacturer has a duty to warn a third party like the FDA, who in 
turn will warn physicians and consumers.462  However, the third-party 
duty doctrine does not specifically contemplate warning the FDA.463  
The Ninth Circuit cites Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. 
in support of this proposition, but in that decision, a manufacturer 
had a duty to warn another manufacturer who incorporated the 
product of the first manufacturer.464  A state law duty for a 
manufacturer to warn a federal regulator has never been 
contemplated.  Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiff’s claim 
fully rests on traditional state law, independent of the FDCA. 
Nonetheless, the plaintiff’s claim based on the third-party duty-to-
warn doctrine should avoid the ambit of Buckman because there is at 
least a semblance of a state law duty.  Manufacturers have a duty to 
provide reasonable care, which includes warning those who can be 
foreseeably harmed.465   
Further, it is hard to believe that the Supreme Court meant to 
extend Buckman as far as the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have taken it.  
The Supreme Court has recognized that in enacting the MDA, it was 
never Congress’s intent to eliminate all state law claims.  As the 
Supreme Court said in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., “it is difficult 
to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means 
of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.”466  However, 
impliedly preempting claims like that of the Stengels may do exactly 
that—remove means of judicial recourse.  Impliedly preempting 
                                                                                                                 
 461. Id. at 24. 
 462. See supra notes 372–73 and accompanying text. 
 463. See supra notes 360–362 and accompanying text. 
 464. See Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1233 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 
Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nem0urs & Co., 44 F.3d 806, 811–12 (9th Cir. 1995)); 
see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 26. 
 465. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 398 (1916) (holding that a 
manufacturer has a duty “either to exercise due care to warn users of the danger or to 
take reasonable care to prevent the article sold from proving dangerous when 
subjected only to customary usage”). 
 466. 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 
(2008) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996)) (holding that “§ 
360k does not prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims premised 
on a violation of FDA regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather 
than add to, federal requirements”). 
350 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
traditional state law tort claims, combined with the Supreme Court’s 
express preemption decision in Riegel, would mean that nothing 
would fit through the narrow gap and survive preemption.467  Further, 
if all tort law claims were preempted, then it would render the 
distinction the Supreme Court made in Riegel and Buckman between 
express and implied preemption meaningless. 
Another way plaintiffs could try to avoid the implied preemption 
thicket would be alleging that Medtronic breached its duty to warn 
physicians and patients.  Such a claim obviously rests on traditional 
state tort law.  Buckman would not be implicated because plaintiff 
would still have a theory of liability in the absence of the FDCA.468  
However, as Judge Watford notes, alleging that a manufacturer 
breached its duty to warn doctors could be expressly preempted.469  
This is because to fit within the parallel claim exception the state law 
duty alleged must be genuinely equivalent to a federal duty.470  The 
CBE regulation allows, but does not require, the manufacturer to 
strengthen its warnings.471  There is no provision in the FDCA 
requiring the FDA to warn physicians; therefore, the imposition of a 
state law duty requiring that physicians be warned is not genuinely 
equivalent to the federal duty.472  Regardless, a plaintiff could avoid 
express preemption by skirting the parallel claim exception.  If the 
Court rules that a generally applicable requirement has no 
preemptive effect, then courts would not have to conduct a parallel 
claim analysis, which means that the genuine equivalency rule would 
not apply.  Hence, a ruling that a generally applicable requirement 
has no preemptive effect would likely cause a plaintiff to avoid both 
express and implied preemption. 
3. Policy Arguments Against the Implied Preemption of 
Traditional State Law Tort Claims 
Although Medtronic looks to the public policy arguments in 
Buckman to impliedly preempt Stengel’s failure-to-warn claim, these 
arguments have more force in the in fraud-on-the-FDA context than 
in the traditional tort law context.  Fraud-on-the-FDA claims are 
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more likely to interfere with the regulatory objectives of the FDA 
than state law tort claims.  The Buckman court’s concerns that fraud-
on-the-FDA claims would (1) interfere with FDA decision-making, 
(2) cause manufacturers to submit unnecessary information to the 
FDA, and (3) deter manufacturers from seeking § 510(k) approval, 
are not as legitimate in the failure-to-warn-context. 
First, the Buckman court was concerned that jury verdicts 
regarding fraud-on-the-FDA claims could interfere with FDA 
decision-making.  The United States as amicus curiae in Stengel 
expressed the same concern with regulatory interference in regards to 
the plaintiffs’ third-party duty-to-warn theory.473  Under this theory, 
the plaintiff would have to prove that if the FDA received adverse 
event reports the FDA would have warned physicians.  According to 
the United States, this causation inquiry could lead to jury second-
guessing of the FDA decision-making process.  However, the 
potential for a conflict between juries and the FDA is reduced in 
cases such as Stengel and Hughes, where FDA warning letters state 
that the manufacturer has not complied with the FDA.474 
Second, the Buckman court held that fraud-on-the-FDA claims 
would create a “deluge of information that the Administration 
neither wants nor needs,” which would hinder the FDA review 
process.475  The risk of a deluge of information is less likely to occur in 
the context of failure-to-warn-claims alleging that the manufacturer 
failed to report adverse events.  Since these claims are based on the 
manufacturer’s conduct after the device has been approved, it is hard 
to see how they will hinder the FDA pre-market approval process.  
Further, in Stengel, plaintiff’s claim alleges that the manufacturer 
violated FDA regulations requiring it to report serious injury or death 
associated with its device.  Reports on death and serious injuries are 
exactly the kind of information that the FDA does want or need.476  
Third, Buckman held that fraud-on-the-FDA claims would deter 
manufacturers from applying for § 510(k) approval out of fear of civil 
liability.  It is unlikely that failure-to-warn claims premised on a 
manufacturer’s post-approval conduct would deter manufacturers 
from applying for PMA in the first place. 
For these reasons, state-law tort claims do not interfere with the 
FDA’s regulatory objectives in the same way as the claims in 
Buckman.  Accordingly, courts should start with the presumption 
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against preemption when conducting an implied preemption analysis.  
The presumption against preemption makes sense in the implied 
preemption context because the text is not clear enough to erase the 
presumption.477  Further, the presumption against preemption should 
apply to traditional-law tort claims because such claims historically 
have been in a field occupied by the states.478  State-law tort claims 
are different than the claims in Buckman, in which the Supreme 
Court refused to apply the presumption because “[p]olicing fraud 
against federal agencies is hardly ‘a field which the States have 
traditionally occupied.’”479 
Another reason to attach the presumption against preemption is 
the need for state-law claims to complement FDA enforcement 
actions.480  The FDA does not have the capacity to ensure that 
manufacturers are complying with FDA post-approval requirements 
on their own.  In contrast to Buckman, where the court held that the 
FDA is amply equipped to police fraud, the FDA is far less equipped 
to enforce its post-approval reporting requirements.  In fact, both 
GAO and FDA reports on post-market surveillance have found that 
the FDA’s ability “to understand the risks of adverse events related 
to the use of medical devices . . . is limited.”481  Among the causes for 
the FDA’s limited post-market surveillance capacity is lack of time, as 
the FDA cannot review all the reports they receive.482  Another 
constraint is that the passive medical device reporting system relies on 
the manufacturer to submit accurate and timely information.483  GAO 
found accurate and timely submissions do not always occur.484  
Therefore, state-law tort claims are needed to make up for the 
deficiencies in the FDA post-market surveillance process. 
CONCLUSION 
Riegel made clear that state law claims that parallel federal 
requirements escape preemption.485  However, Riegel left uncertain 
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exactly which claims fall within the narrow gap, known as the parallel 
claim exception.  In the wake of Riegel, lower courts have adopted 
conflicting interpretations of the contours of the narrow gap.  While 
the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have held that an industry-wide 
violation is expressly preempted under Riegel, the Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have allowed these claims to fit through 
the narrow gap.  While the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have expanded 
Buckman to impliedly preempt state law tort claims, the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have again allowed these claims to fit 
through the narrow gap. 
Stengel, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision, in pending certiorari, 
had the opportunity to clarify the confusion surrounding the narrow 
gap.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court avoided the issue, thereby 
perpetuating the confusion.  In a subsequent Class III medical device 
case involving parallel claims, the Supreme Court should grant 
certiorari because a parallel claim should not survive preemption in 
some circuits, but not in others.  It is likely that the divide amongst 
the circuits will continue to widen, and it is only a matter of time 
before the Supreme Court will have to clarify the contours of the 
parallel claim doctrine.  In clarifying the scope of the parallel claim 
doctrine, the Supreme Court should preserve a sufficiently sized gap 
for plaintiff’s claims to avoid preemption.  This is consistent with the 
Supreme Court precedent that has recognized that plaintiffs need 
some means of judicial recourse.486  Parallel claims are also needed to 
complement FDA oversight of medical devices, which is inadequate 
to enforce compliance with post-approval requirements by itself. 
A violation of a generally applicable requirement such as the MDR 
should be sufficient to survive both express and implied preemption.  
To require plaintiff to plead a device-specific requirement to escape 
express preemption would unnecessarily narrow or maybe even 
eliminate the parallel claim exception.  Once a plaintiff escapes 
express preemption by alleging a state law tort claim premised on a 
violation of an industry-wide requirement, he should not have to face 
the additional burden of proving his claim is not impliedly preempted.  
Implied preemption of state law tort claims would also essentially 
close the narrow gap left open for plaintiffs, in contravention of 
Buckman and Riegel’s intent to keep the gap open.  It should be 
recognized that constricting the gap, as the Eighth Circuit has done, is 
neither sound public policy nor supported by precedent. 
                                                                                                                 
 486. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 266 (1984) (holding that “it 
is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of 
judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct”). 
354 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
In the alternative, to ensure that plaintiffs still have a remedy, the 
Court could rule that generally applicable requirements such as the 
MDR have no preemptive effect.  This ruling is supported by Lohr.  If 
the MDR has no preemptive effect then plaintiff could prevail on the 
theory that the manufacturer should have strengthened its warnings 
pursuant to the CBE regulation.  A claim premised on a CBE 
regulation should survive implied preemption because it is based on 
traditional state law.  Further, the Supreme Court held in Wyeth that 
a claim premised on the CBE regulation survives implied preemption 
including both obstacle and conflict preemption.487 
However, holding that a generally applicable requirement has no 
preemptive effect and then following Wyeth’s implied preemption 
rationale in regards to medical devices would effectively eliminate the 
parallel claim exception that the Supreme Court has vigorously tried 
to preserve.488  Instead of looking to device-specific requirements in 
the PMA, plaintiffs would rely on vague and open-ended industry-
wide requirements to escape dismissal.  This probably was not the 
result the Supreme Court intended.489  Therefore, recognizing the 
parallel claim exception but widening it enough to provide means of 
judicial recourse seems to be the best option. 
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